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Molly J. Walker Wilson* 
“We have rejected an approach to individual liberties that ‘abstracts 
from the right to its purposes, and then eliminates the right.’” 
—Justice Antonin Scalia1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The pervasiveness of plea bargains in our criminal justice system is 
of concern to many, and scholars in the legal academy have often been 
critical of the practice.2  One reason for the unease is that plea deals are 
often made quickly and without adequate investigation or consultation.  
Once a deal is secured, the defendant forfeits the protections that come 
with a trial.  Because of the number of defendants and limitations on 
resources, prosecutors and public defenders both depend upon 
defendants taking deals and staying out of court.3  The public relies upon 
ethical exercises of prosecutorial discretion, and professional mandates 
of impartiality (for judges) and zealous representation (for criminal 
defenders) to protect criminal defendants.  These dictates, in concert with 
                                                          
* Professor of Law and Psychology, Saint Louis University School of Law.  I am indebted to my 
fellow panelists at the 2015 American Bar Association National Conference on Professional 
Responsibility, Tigran Eldred, Robert Prentice, and Cathy O’Grady, for insights that prompted me to 
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 1.   Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 185 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing United States 
v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 145 (2006)). 
 2.   See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652 
(1981); Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179 
(1975) [hereinafter The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining]; Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial 
Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059 (1976); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is 
Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037 (1984); Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful 
Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37 
(1983); Kenneth Kipnis, Plea Bargaining: A Critic’s Rejoinder, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 555 (1979); 
John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (1978); Robert E. Scott & 
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1967–68 (1992) [hereinafter 
Plea Bargaining as Contract]. 
 3.   David P. Leonard, Waiver of Protections Against the Use of Plea Bargains and Plea 
Bargaining Statements After Mezzanatto, 23 CRIM. JUST., Fall 2008, at 8, 9 (“Both sides know that 
settlement is a necessity in the criminal justice system.  In fact, the system cannot function unless 
only a small percentage of cases are tried.”). 
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constitutional rules and general oversight by higher courts, lead insiders 
and some observers to argue that while the system is imperfect, it is 
adequate.  However, structural features of the criminal justice system 
create inevitable psychological pitfalls.  Heavy caseloads for prosecutors 
and defense lawyers, along with broad prosecutorial discretion, and 
perverse incentives exacerbate problems of cognitive bias, motivated 
reasoning, and ethical blindness.  A number of scholars have written 
about behavioral biases in prosecutorial decision-making, but biases that 
influence criminal defense lawyers have received little attention.4  This is 
an important omission because defense counsel is often the proxy for the 
defendant for purposes of decision-making. 
The criminal defense attorney is presumed to be the best judge of 
what is in the best interest of her client.  There are some good reasons for 
this; attorneys who represent indigent criminal defendants almost always 
have a better understanding of the law and criminal court procedures.  In 
the case of public defenders, who represent the vast majority of indigent 
defendants, experience with the courts and local judges and prosecutors 
can be invaluable.  In addition to knowledge and experience, a criminal 
defense attorney can bring some objectivity to decisions made in the best 
interests of the defendant.  Finally, a good lawyer will act in the interest 
of her client, even when the client seems to be bent on self-destruction or 
is putting the interests of another party ahead of his own. 
However, for every advantage offered by the defense attorney, there 
is a reason to worry that the attorney’s choices are tainted.  Even aspects 
of the lawyer’s past practice that are arguably beneficial can ultimately 
be a liability.  One example is the lawyer’s familiarity with the system.  
The closer the lawyer is to the process, the better she knows the players, 
and the more times she has seen a client go through the process, the less 
likely she is to look critically at how the process is impacting the 
defendant.   
The most experienced defense attorney is the public defender, who 
gains a great deal of experience by virtue of having an endless supply of 
needy clients.  The heavy caseload that results in the wealth of 
experience for these lawyers also severely limits the amount of attention 
public defenders can give individual defendants.  Not only does the 
public defender not have the luxury of carefully considering the various 
options available to her client, she may often not even have the time to 
                                                          
 4.   There are some notable exceptions.  For example, see Tigran W. Eldred, Prescriptions for 
Ethical Blindness: Improving Advocacy for Indigent Defendants in Criminal Cases, 65 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 333, 357 (2013) [hereinafter Prescriptions for Ethical Blindness].  
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gather basic information.  In many cases, more serious cases become a 
priority, preventing the defense attorney from spending the time to 
carefully interview and investigate the cases of clients with less serious 
charges.  As a result, the attorney does not have an adequate basis to 
determine what is best for her client, what he wants, or even what he 
knows about the alleged crime.5  Meanwhile, the requirements of many 
clients force the public defender to make hasty decisions and to balance 
the needs of each individual defendant against those of others who are 
waiting in the wings. 
Traditional analyses of the role of the public defender in the criminal 
justice system have not explored how limited resources can exacerbate 
decisional biases, and have therefore underestimated the public-defense 
crisis.  Empirical research has provided a wealth of information 
regarding how cognitive and social biases can influence choice in a 
variety of contexts.6  This research has received widespread attention 
from the most influential thinkers and policy makers, and the legitimacy 
of using behavioral data to shape policy and practice is well established.  
Yet, although psychological findings have been applied to consumer 
contexts, voting behavior, economic trends, politics, judicial analysis, 
and many other areas, the behavioral science lens is rarely applied to 
public defenders.  And yet, research on cognitive and behavioral biases 
has special importance for the public defender context. 
Priming, anchoring, belief perseverance, and the confirmation and 
over-confidence biases lead public defenders to form an impression of a 
case based upon incomplete evidence, which results in the failure to 
adequately discount questionable inculpating evidence and the 
                                                          
 5.   This article does not address the thorny question of autonomy in decision-making for 
criminal defendants with identified mental illness.  As the Court pointed out in Edwards, “a right of 
self-representation at trial will not ‘affirm the dignity’ of a defendant who lacks the mental capacity 
to conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel.”  554 U.S. at 176 (quoting McKaskle v. 
Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176–77 (1984)).  Rather, this article’s scope is limited to the allocation of 
decision-making power between a mentally competent criminal defendant and her attorney.  
 6.   Law reviews are replete with invocation of behavioral science in legal decision contexts.  
See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Symposium, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision 
Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998); see also Russell 
Korobkin, What Comes After Victory for Behavioral Law and Economics?, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1653 (2011); RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF 
ECONOMIC LIFE (Princeton 1994) (1991); Daniel A. Farber, Toward a New Legal Realism, 68 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 279, 303 (2001) (reviewing BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 
2000)); Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law’s Leverage: Behavioral 
Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1141 (2001).  Articles dating back to the 
middle of the twenty-first century reveal that early applications of behavioral science to legal norms 
foreshadowed what was to come: Myron Roomkin & Roger I. Abrams, Using Behavioral Evidence 
in NLRB Regulation: A Proposal, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1441 (1977); Arthur Selwyn Miller, On the 
Interdependence of Law and the Behavioral Sciences, 43 TEX. L. REV. 1094 (1965). 
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undervaluing of exculpating evidence.  Research on motivated reasoning 
suggests that public defenders will be overly confident and self-serving 
in their evaluations to cases, and will be “blind” to legitimate ethical 
issues in how they represent their clients.  A number of features of the 
criminal justice system increase the defense attorney’s susceptibility to 
these biases.  First, when cognitive resources are stretched, as is the case 
when a public defender is representing a large number of defendants, 
biased judgments are more likely.  Psychologists refer to this type of 
situation as high “cognitive load.”7  Scores of studies have shown that 
cognitive shortcuts—also called “heuristics”—are far more likely when 
individuals are under cognitive load.8  Hence, a public defender is more 
vulnerable to these biases than she would be were she not under severe 
time and resource constraints.  Another feature of the criminal justice 
system that can contribute to bias is the process by which law 
enforcement extracts information from suspects.  Common police 
interrogation practices are known to encourage false confessions.9  In 
addition to influencing police, prosecutors, and jurors, confessions also 
impact defense attorney evaluations of the strength of a case. 
The same factors that lead attorneys to make errors—limited 
resources and time and early exposure to the prosecutor’s evidence—also 
make the plea more attractive to the defense attorney.10  The vulnerable 
defendant who is most at risk for falsely confessing is also the defendant 
who is most likely to agree to accept a plea, even when he is innocent.11  
The more harried and rushed the defense attorney, the less likely she is to 
perceive weaknesses in the prosecution’s case.  When a defense attorney 
has very little time to spend with her client, research tells us that the 
client is likely to lack confidence in the quality of representation, and 
                                                          
 7.   See Anuj K. Shah & Daniel M. Oppenheimer, Heuristics Made Easy: An Effort-Reduction 
Framework, 134 PSYCHOL. BULL. 207, 207, 212 (2008). (“As the demands on limited cognitive 
resources increase, people may employ methods or strategies that reduce the effort they expend on 
computation.  We will therefore refer to heuristics as methods that use principles of effort-reduction 
and simplification.  By definition, heuristics must allow decision makers to process information in a 
less effortful manner than one would expect from an optimal decision rule.”).  
 8.   Id. at 207. 
 9.   See generally Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and 
Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3 (2010). 
 10.   “You’ve got so many cases, limited resources, and there’s no relief.  You go to work, you 
get more cases.  You have to triage.”  Hannah Levintova, Jaeah Lee & Brett Brownell, Charts: Why 
You’re in Deep Trouble if You Can’t Afford a Lawyer, MOTHER JONES (May 6, 2013) [hereinafter 
MOTHER JONES] (quoting Tanya Greene of the American Civil Liberties Union), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/05/public-defenders-gideon-supreme-court-charts.  
 11.   See infra notes 117, 141, 156 and accompanying text (discussing the pressures that cause 
defense attorneys and innocent defendants to accept plea bargains). 
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may be more likely to view a deal as being his best choice.12  Under 
these circumstances, an innocent defendant may conclude that his best 
bet is to take the deal and avoid the risk of a longer sentence.13 
Even in the case of guilty defendants, accepting plea bargains 
without carefully weighing the strength of the case is problematic.  
Criminal defendants likely underestimate the opportunity costs 
associated plea deals—namely, giving up the right to force the 
prosecutor to prove her case.  Considering what the defendant is 
surrendering, the deals offered by prosecutors do not sufficiently 
discount the penalty.  Because prosecutors routinely overcharge,14 many 
charges would not hold up at trial—when the burden of proof is on the 
state.  Accordingly, the “discount” offered with a plea is often close to 
what the defendant would receive at trial anyway, in which case the 
defendant would fare best by going to trial.  A trial would afford him 
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment protections, as well as judicial 
oversight and a variety of other procedural benefits.15 
Judges, who suffer the effects of overloaded dockets, generally 
encourage plea bargains, and courts rarely provide defendants with after-
the-fact remedies for shabby lawyering—particularly where plea 
bargains are concerned.16  Meanwhile, plea bargains are subject to the 
least amount of supervision because they occur behind closed doors and 
away from even minimal judicial supervision.  So, although defense 
                                                          
 12.   Id. 
 13.   A number of articles have pointed to the risk of an increase in conviction for innocent 
defendants as one of the primary objections to the proliferation of the plea bargain.  See Michael O. 
Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices in the Federal Courts, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
293, 295 (1975); Plea Bargaining as Contract, supra note 2, at 1950–51; David L. Shapiro, 
Symposium, Should a Guilty Plea Have Preclusive Effect?, 70 IOWA L. REV. 27, 40–41 (1984); 
Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2297–2300 (2006) 
(arguing for a partial ban on plea bargaining to reduce the likelihood innocent defendants will plead 
guilty); Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful Convictions, 42 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1154 (2005). 
 14.   Timothy Lynch, The Case Against Plea Bargaining, 26 REG., no. 3, Fall 2003, at 24, 24 
(“There is no doubt that government officials deliberately use their power to pressure people who 
have been accused of crime, and who are presumed innocent, to confess their guilt and waive their 
right to a formal trial.  We know this to be true because prosecutors freely admit that this is what 
they do.”). 
 15.   Id. at 26 (“Plea bargaining rests on the constitutional fiction that our government does not 
retaliate against individuals who wish to exercise their right to trial by jury.”). 
 16.   Jason Solomon notes that judges who are faced with the question of whether a defendant 
has been deprived of meaningful representation are unlikely to purposely look to social science data 
in order to determine whether an oversight, action or inaction was, or was not, harmless in terms of 
the impact on the jury’s decision to convict.  Jason M. Solomon, Causing Constitutional Harm: How 
Tort Law Can Help Determine Harmless Error in Criminal Trials, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1053, 1071 
(2005).  
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attorneys admit that they use psychological pressure to encourage their 
clients to accept deals, there is virtually no remedy available to 
defendants who regret their choice later. 
In sum, defense lawyers are prone to biased decision-making and are 
incentivized to make concessions to get their clients’ cases settled 
efficiently.  Their choices are accorded deference by courts and members 
of the public, both for practical reasons and because of an assumption 
that lawyers make better decisions.  Simultaneously, the criminal 
defendant’s opinion regarding pretrial and trial decisions is minimalized, 
trivialized, or even mocked.  There is widespread dismissal and even 
condemnation of efforts of defendants to take control of their cases.17 
Criminal defendants themselves can serve as a check on the current 
quick-plead system.  As some scholars have noted, “[o]verworked and 
underpaid defense lawyers frequently do not have the information or the 
resources to assess the government’s case and accurately predict trial 
outcomes.”18  The public defender often has very limited time to meet 
with her client, but the defendant has ready access to much of the 
information the lawyer does not.  Some of this information is relevant to 
the choice of defense strategy.  For example, the defendant may have a 
better sense for the motivations of witnesses, has better insight into the 
amount of risk he is comfortable assuming in weighing any proffered 
plea deal against going to trial. 
Although many assume that criminal defendants make poor 
decisions, evidence suggests otherwise.  Studies of outcomes in trials 
where defendants took control of their own defenses reveal that 
defendants do as well or better than criminal defense lawyers.19  Equally 
important, research reveals that criminal defendants who are 
substantially involved in planning and decision-making experience a 
range of positive effects, regardless of the ultimate disposition of their 
                                                          
 17.   Pamela R. Metzger, Fear of Adversariness: Using Gideon to Restrict Defendants’ 
Invocation of Adversary Procedures, 122 YALE L.J. 2550, 2555–56 & n.24 (2013) [hereinafter Fear 
of Adversariness] (“I note but lack the space to comment further upon the patronizing and dismissive 
way in which the ABA comment describes the defendant who seeks to assist counsel in a proceeding 
that puts the defendant—and the defendant alone—at risk of incarceration, or even death.”). 
 18.   Susan R. Klein, Aleza S. Remis & Donna Lee Elm, Waiving the Criminal Justice System: 
An Empirical and Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 75–76 (2015). 
 19.   Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at the 
Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423, 447–51 (2007) [hereinafter Defending the Right of 
Self-Representation].  Aggregated data from criminal trial outcomes suggests that bad attorney 
decisions are costly for criminal defendants.  Almost a third of people exonerated through the use of 
DNA argued that their defense lawyer made poor choices.  BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE 
INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 205 (2011). 
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case.20  The science is clear; human beings do better on a range of 
measures when they take control of their own future outcomes. 
This article challenges the current attorney-controlled, plea-bargain 
system of criminal justice and calls for a greater role for criminal 
defendant choice in pretrial decisions.  The central claim of this Article is 
that defense attorneys are vulnerable to biases that influence their 
perceptions of their clients’ cases and predispose them to be overly 
favorable to plea deals.  Giving defendants more voice in pretrial choices 
will lead to more pretrial investigation and fewer ill-advised plea deals. 
Part II of this Article discusses the psychological biases that 
influence defense attorney decision-making.  These biases include those 
resulting from repeat experience with the criminal justice system, biases 
associated with a desire to confirm existing beliefs, and biases that are 
motivated by a need to preserve one’s own positive self-concept.  Part III 
delves into the phenomenon of the “meet-em-and-plead-em” culture of 
public defense.  This Part outlines the features of the current crisis in 
public defense and explains how the lack of resources lead public 
defenders to pressure clients to take deals offered by prosecutors.  Part 
IV introduces the problem of the innocent indigent defendant and 
explains why attorneys’ incentives to pressure clients to take deals can 
result in bad choices.  Part V provides a closer look at how lawyers’ 
biases lead them to favor deals and how courts nevertheless routinely 
privilege attorney choice.  Part VI proposes an alternative model, one in 
which the criminal defendant himself plays a dominant role in every 
major step in the criminal defense process.  This Part reveals a number of 
advantages to a defendant-led defense, and provides a data-driven 
rationale for why the defendant, and not the attorney, should be in 
control of the decision process. 
II.  BIASES THAT INFLUENCE CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 
A.  Biases Stemming from Repeat Experience with the Criminal Justice 
System 
Prosecutors and public defenders operate in a system in which plea 
agreements dominate the landscape.21  The fact that a steady stream of 
                                                          
 20.   See M. Somjen Frazer, The Impact of the Community Court Model on Defendant 
Perceptions of Fairness, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION 14–20 (2006), 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/Procedural_Fairness.pdf. 
 21.   See LINDSEY DEVERS, BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE, PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING: 
RESEARCH SUMMARY 2 (2011), 
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criminal defendants accept plea deals perpetuates the notion that most—
if not all—defendants are guilty.  Proponents of the status quo generally 
assume that criminal defendants who accept plea agreements are guilty 
of criminal acts.  In fact, in order to maintain the belief in their own 
professionally ethicality, defense attorneys must subscribe to this belief.  
As a result of functioning in the current system, expectations about the 
guilt of criminal defendants is reinforced and perpetuated; virtually all 
criminal defendants begin to appear guilty of the charged crimes.  
Moreover, because defense attorneys are obliged to obtain for her client 
the best outcome possible, the attorney must also believe that plea 
bargains are optimal for her clients in almost all cases.  These 
assumptions have important implications for how a defense attorney 
makes judgments about her client and the actions that she takes in her 
role as counsel for that client. 
1. Priming 
Priming describes a situation in which early exposure to a concept, 
idea or belief sensitizes the subject to a later presentation of the same or a 
similar target.22  By virtue of experience, defense attorneys—particularly 
those who have been in the system for a long period of time—are primed 
to expect (a) that their clients are guilty and (b) that the best outcome is a 
plea bargain.  Priming a concept influences later acceptance for similar 
concepts by sensitizing cognitive and affective reactions to subsequent 
targets.23  Priming works because early exposure activates certain 
knowledge structures, which, in turn, influence individuals’ 
interpretation of later events or issues.24  The accessibility of a particular 
                                                          
https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf; Matthew Clarke, Dramatic 
Increase in Percentage of Criminal Cases Being Plea Bargained, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Jan. 15, 
2013), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2013/jan/15/dramatic-increase-in-percentage-of-
criminal-cases-being-plea-bargained. 
 22.   See Robert B. Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling the 
Concept of Norms to Reduce Littering in Public Places, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1015, 
1023 (1990) (citations omitted) (“Most, although not all, explanations of priming effects incorporate 
the notion of spreading activation, which posits that similar concepts are linked together in memory 
within a network of nodes and that activation of one concept results in the spreading of the activation 
along the network to other related concepts.”). 
 23.   Sheila T. Murphy & R. B. Zajonc, Affect, Cognition, and Awareness: Affective Priming 
with Optimal and Suboptimal Stimulus Exposures, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 723, 734, 
736 (1993) (finding that millisecond-long encounters with negative or positive stimuli can produce 
non-specific emotional reactions to unrelated stimuli). 
 24.   See generally Robert S. Wyer & Thomas K. Srull, Category Accessibility: Some 
Theoretical and Empirical Issues Concerning the Processing of Social Stimulus Information, in 
SOCIAL COGNITION: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM 161–197 (E. Tory Higgins et al. eds., 1981).  
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concept—the ease with which the concept is retrieved and used—is 
enhanced by prior exposure to the concept.25  Priming has been 
demonstrated in a wide variety of contexts.  For example, experimenters 
have been able to prime morality and increase ethical behavior by asking 
people to recall the Ten Commandments.26  Priming is a technique 
commonly used by lawmakers to influence members of the public.27 
Priming is powerful because mere exposure to one thing can change 
emotions about, interpretations of, and even memories of specific 
phenomena.28  The experience that serves as a prime will later be more 
influential and more important.  The priming effect increases with the 
number of times the knowledge category is activated.29  Priming can 
make a certain idea seem so correct that an individual will disregard 
information that contradicts the notion that was primed.30 
After repeatedly observing criminal defendants admit guilt and 
accept punishment, the concept of the guilty defendant becomes 
perennially primed.  This can make the cognitive link between criminal 
defendant and guilt pervasive, lasting, and powerful.  The tendency to 
start out with a presupposition of guilt influences attorneys’ subsequent 
judgments about the character of the defendant, his past acts, the 
                                                          
 25.   Youjae Yi, The Effects of Contextual Priming in Print Advertisements, 17 J. CONSUMER 
RES. 215, 216 (1990); see also Tory E. Higgins & Gillian A. King, Accessibility of Social 
Constructs: Information Processing Consequences of Individual and Contextual Variability, in 
PERSONALITY, COGNITION, AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 69–122 (Nancy Cantor & John F. Kihlstrom 
eds., 1981).  
 26.   Nina Mazar, On Amir & Dan Ariely, The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-
Concept Maintenance, 45 J. MARKETING RES. 633, 635–37 (2008) (finding that people acted more 
ethically after being prompted to think of honor codes and the Ten Commandments).  
 27.   See Dietram A. Scheufele & David Tewksbury, Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: 
The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models, 57 J. COMM. 9, 9–11 (2007) (citation omitted) (“The 
1980s and early 1990s . . . brought the most recent stage of political-effects research.  Sometimes 
labeled ‘negation models,’ approaches like priming and framing were based on the idea that mass 
media had potentially strong attitudinal effects . . . .”). 
 28.   “[I]f we are primed to think about baseball, we are more likely to remember seeing a 
baseball on a table even if the table is crowded with many different objects of which the baseball is 
only one.”  Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Power of Priming in Legal Advocacy: Using the Science of 
First Impressions to Persuade the Reader, 89 OR. L. REV. 305, 306 (2010). 
 29.   Thomas K. Srull & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., The Role of Category Accessibility in the 
Interpretation of Information About Persons: Some Determinants and Implications, 37 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1660, 1661–62 (1979) (noting that, once a trait or schema is made 
more accessible by previous cognitive activity, the likelihood that the schema will be used to encode 
new information is increased). 
 30.   See Daniel G. Linz & Steven Penrod, Increasing Attorney Persuasiveness in the 
Courtroom, 8 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 9–10 (1984); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Organized 
Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause 
Other Social Harms), in BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS 144, 147–48 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) 
(discussing how people tend to be biased against revising their opinions).  
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evidence, and the wisdom of accepting a plea deal.  Priming is also 
closely linked with anchoring, belief perseverance, and a number of other 
biases discussed below. 
2. Anchoring 
Research has shown that, when faced with a task, people are heavily 
influenced by information they receive early in the process.  As priming 
research suggests, that which comes first is given special emphasis.  For 
example, when people are provided an initial value, they tend to 
“anchor” on that value and adjust away from it.31  This is true even when 
that initial value is arbitrary, or even outrageous.  In an experiment in 
which business school students were asked to negotiate to purchase a 
company, researchers found a 5.1 million dollar difference in final 
purchase price, depending upon whether the buyer or the seller proposed 
the initial price.32  Although the students arrived at an agreement, the 
party who proposed the opening bid did best; if the buyers made an offer 
first, they were able to buy the company for far less than when the seller 
set the initial price.33 
In a standard business transaction, either party might start the 
negotiation.  However, in the criminal context, the first offer usually 
originates with the prosecutor.  Furthermore, a savvy prosecutor 
develops standard negotiation tactics that make her desired result more 
likely; often a prosecutor’s strategic approach involves use of an anchor 
value.34  In other words, prosecutors routinely exploit this bias and 
                                                          
 31.   Adam D. Galinsky & Thomas Mussweiler, First Offers as Anchors: The Role of 
Perspective-Taking and Negotiator Focus, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 657, 660 (2001) 
[hereinafter First Offers as Anchors]; see also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1128 (1974) (explaining the anchoring effect). 
 32.   First Offers as Anchors, supra note 31, at 660–61. 
 33.   When seller-students made the opening offer, they first offered to sell the plant for an 
average of $26.6 million, and the average final purchase price was $24.8 million.  Id. at 661.  When 
buyer-students made the initial offer, they first offered to buy the plant for an average of $16.5 
million, and the average final purchase price was $19.7 million.  Id.  The difference between final 
purchase price (depending upon who set the initial offer) was $5.1 million dollars.  Id. 
 34.   Stephan Bibas describes this scenario:  
For example, a prosecutor might initially offer a robbery defendant twenty years’ 
imprisonment by piling on every plausible enhancement.  The defendant, of course, 
rejects this unreasonable offer out of hand, but the initial offer serves as a high 
anchor. . . .  By the time the prosecutor comes down to twelve years, the defendant is 
ready to jump at the deal.  If the prosecutor had started out at twelve years, however, the 
defendant might have anchored on that number as the highest likely sentence and rejected 
it as a bad deal. 
Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2517–18 
(2004) [hereinafter Shadow of Trial]. 
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perceive the results of these negotiations as fair, in large part because of 
the self-serving bias (discussed below).35  Distortions caused by 
anchoring are particularly worrisome, given the structure of plea 
negotiations and the large percentage of cases resulting in plea deals.36 
3. Belief Perseverance 
The priming and anchoring effects both describe the way that early 
information can distort later decision-making.  The tendency for early-
formed impressions to last and last, even when disconfirming 
information is provided, has been dubbed “belief perseverance.”37  
Researchers have found that participants who are provided false 
feedback on a task maintain initial impressions of performance even after 
having been told that the feedback was bogus.38  In one study on 
perceptions of personality traits and professions, people who were led to 
believe that there was a negative or positive association between risk 
preferences and firefighting ability adhered to this belief, even when the 
information was discredited.39 
Belief perseverance is pervasive and powerful, as has been 
demonstrated in studies on prosecutors’ assessments of guilt.  Real-life 
manifestations of this bias occur when prosecutors refuse to accept the 
validity of irrefutable exculpatory evidence post-conviction.40  In less 
                                                          
 35.   Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 
1337, 1338 (1995) (pointing out that parties on opposite sides perceive their own offers as fair). 
 36.   Crushing caseloads have led to a “plea bargain assembly line” in many states.  Laura I. 
Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731, 769 (2010); Colin Miller, Anchors Away: Why the 
Anchoring Effect Suggests That Judges Should Be Able to Participate in Plea Discussions, 54 B.C. 
L. REV. 1667, 1688–89 (2013) [hereinafter Anchors Away]. 
 37.   Craig A. Anderson & Kathryn L. Kellam, Belief Perseverance, Biased Assimilation, and 
Covariation Detection: The Effects of Hypothetical Social Theories and New Data, 18 PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 555, 555, 557 (1992); see also Lee Ross, Mark R. Lepper & Michael 
Hubbard, Perseverance in Self-Perception and Social Perception: Biased Attributional Processes in 
the Debriefing Paradigm, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 880, 880, 891 (1975) [hereinafter 
Perseverance in Self-Perception and Social Perception]. 
 38.   Perseverance in Self-Perception and Social Perception, supra note 37, at 882–84 (noting 
that, even after having been shown the experiment materials that randomly assigned participants to 
various feedback conditions, people continued to exhibit beliefs consistent with the original, false 
feedback). 
 39.   Craig A. Anderson, Mark R. Lepper & Lee Ross, Perseverance of Social Theories: The 
Role of Explanation in the Persistence of Discredited Information, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1037, 1039–40 (1980). 
 40.   One example is the case of Robert Lee Stinson, whose conviction was rendered suspect 
when DNA testing revealed that the bite mark from the victim was not Stinson’s.  Assistant District 
Attorney Norman Gahn refused to retry Stinson, but asserted that no factual evidence implied 
Stinson’s innocence. Tom Kertscher, Prosecutors Won’t Retry Innocence Project Case, MILWAUKEE 
J. SENTINEL (July 27, 2009), http://archive.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/51793602.html. 
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starkly obvious cases, attorneys on both sides can be influenced by initial 
impressions.  The simple fact that a criminal defendant has been charged 
and indicted can imply guilt, and research demonstrating that early 
judgments can be sticky and resistant to modification has been 
demonstrated in numerous studies.41  When a defendant has confessed, 
even the most diligent defense counsel may give up any notion of 
innocence.  This is true—as behavioral science demonstrates—even 
when there are good reasons to believe that the confession may have 
been coerced.42  As discussed later in this Article, jurors are significantly 
more likely to convict a defendant who has confessed, even when there is 
good reason to suspect the validity of the confession.43  A criminal 
justice insider, such as a prosecutor or defense attorney, may be 
particularly unlikely to deviate from an initial judgment.  Research has 
shown that experts are particularly confident in the veracity of their own 
judgments and are resistant to change.44 
B. Biases Relating to Confirming Existing Beliefs 
Closely linked to belief perseverance, another set of biases relates to 
a tendency for individuals to cling to initial attitudes.  The biases 
discussed below explain how lingering judgments can influence how 
people react to novel information, as well as whether individuals are 
likely to search out and interpret new evidence.  Response sets, response 
bias, anchoring, belief perseverance and other biases can cause 
individuals to incorrectly interpret future situations based upon their 
knowledge or beliefs from past outcomes or experience.  It is therefore 
unlikely that even the most devoted public defender will genuinely 
evaluate the likelihood of guilt or innocence from a “fresh perspective” 
with each new client.  This is particularly true when a new client has an 
                                                          
 41.   See Martin F. Davies, Belief Persistence After Evidential Discrediting: The Impact of 
Generated Versus Provided Explanations on the Likelihood of Discredited Outcomes, 33 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 561, 562 (1997); Craig A. Anderson, Abstract and Concrete Data in 
the Perseverance of Social Theories: When Weak Data Lead to Unshakeable Beliefs, 19 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 93, 95 (1983); Hollyn M. Johnson & Colleen M. Seifert, Sources of 
the Continued Influence Effect: When Misinformation in Memory Affects Later Influences, 20 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 1420, 1432 (1994). 
 42.   See infra notes 158–61 and accompanying text. 
 43.   Saul M. Kassin & Holly Sukel, Coerced Confessions and the Jury: An Experimental Test 
of the “Harmless Error” Rule, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 27–46 (1997). 
 44.   Andrea O. Baumann et al., Overconfidence Among Physicians and Nurses: The ‘Micro-
Certainty, Macro-Uncertainty’ Phenomenon, 32 SOC. SCI. & MED. 167 (1991).  For discussion on 
over-confidence bias, see also William A. Edmundson, Contextualist Answers to Skepticism, and 
What a Lawyer Cannot Know, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 14 (2002) (“I do not for a moment deny that 
criminal-defense lawyers routinely form the belief that their clients are guilty.”). 
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old record.  Past criminal acts can prime the defense attorney to think 
about past clients with similar records, and can render those clients 
cognitively available.  This phenomenon is likely to occur even for 
attorneys who aspire to represent their clients zealously. 
1.  Confirmation Bias 
The confirmation bias has received a great deal of attention in the 
criminal justice literature—particularly from scholars trying to explain 
the phenomenon of wrongful convictions.  Many commentators have 
written about the tendency of prosecutors to hone in on a particular 
person of interest, selectively seeking out evidence that tends to 
implicate that person, and failing to see holes in the case against him.45  
Less focus has been placed upon the potential for this bias to influence 
the defendant’s own counsel.  However, as one scholar puts it, 
“[i]dentity-based prejudices, particularly racial bias, often trigger 
confirmation bias . . . .”46  Differences in socio-economic background, 
education, and race can influence even diligent defense attorneys 
powerfully, and without the attorneys being conscious of them.47  
Implicit biases trigger initial expectations, and later evidence is 
interpreted to be consistent with these early attitudes.  Saul Kassin and 
                                                          
 45.   Examples of works on this topic include: Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, 
Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 183 (2007) [hereinafter Prosecutorial 
Passion]; Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 NYU J. L. & 
LIBERTY 512 (2007) [hereinafter An Invitation to Prosecutors]; Barbara O’Brien, A Recipe for Bias: 
An Empirical Look at the Interplay Between Institutional Incentives and Bounded Rationality in 
Prosecutorial Decision Making, 74 MO. L. REV. 999 (2009); Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial 
Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the Department of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271 (2013); and 
DAVID A. HARRIS, FAILED EVIDENCE: WHY LAW ENFORCEMENT RESISTS SCIENCE (2012) (exploring 
the question of why investigators and prosecutors resist the application of social science findings to 
their work).  
 46.   Simon Stern, Constructive Knowledge, Probable Cause, and Administrative 
Decisionmaking, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085, 1121 (2007) (“At its most serious, such bias results 
in strained interpretations of the available evidence and failure to take note of evidence that erodes 
belief in the suspect’s guilt, incriminates someone else, or is simply unaccountable under the 
preferred explanation.”).  For other discussions of race and the confirmation bias, see Sheri Lynn 
Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214 (1983); Tracey Maclin, Race 
and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 387 (1998); David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement 
by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 296 (2001).  
 47.   See L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender 
Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626, 2636 (2013) (arguing that “[w]hen translated to the context of [public 
defender] triage, these studies suggest that when clients are black or otherwise criminally 
stereotyped, [implicit biases] can influence evidence evaluation, potentially causing [public 
defenders] to unintentionally interpret information as more probative of guilt.  Consequently, [public 
defenders] may determine that the state will have little difficulty meeting its burden of proof and 
thus, that the case does not warrant much effort.”). 
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others have more recently discussed how, when evidence in a case is 
related, confessions may also result in “a chain of confirmation biases” 
that affect investigators, perceptions of other evidence in the case, and 
post-conviction review.48 
Certain features of a defendant’s case or situation—such as the 
existence of an eyewitness identification or a confession—form the basis 
for a belief that is substantiated by future interpretations of ambiguous 
evidence.  Kassin coined the term “corroboration inflation”49 to describe 
how independent pieces of evidence can seem to accumulate and appear 
supportive of initial beliefs.  Researchers have shown how forensic 
analysis can be tainted by the confirmation bias in a variety of ways.  In 
the course of an investigation the way a defendant is interviewed can 
infect his responses, and increase the chance that the information gleaned 
from the interview will appear to support early conclusions.  In one 
study, researchers50 found that the expectations of polygraph examiners 
influence how they conduct their interviews as well as what conclusions 
they draw from the test results. 
Because public defenders are repeat players in a criminal justice 
system stocked with defendants who overwhelmingly plead guilty, the 
“guilty” defendant is an anchor.  Limited time and resources increase the 
chance that a public defender will use heuristics—rules of thumb—in 
making decisions about how to triage cases.51  Confirmation bias 
suggests that when a defendant has confessed, or there is other impactful 
evidence of guilt, a lawyer is unlikely to see discrepancies between other 
evidence and that original incriminating evidence.  The human mind, 
which strives to find sense in the world, will attempt to make a whole of 
the parts, leading to unconscious assumptions about how the pieces fit 
together. 
                                                          
 48.   Saul M. Kassin, Why Confessions Trump Innocence, 67 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 431, 441 
(2012) (stating that “false confessions, once taken, arouse a strong inference of guilt, thereby 
unleashing a chain of confirmation biases that make the consequences difficult to overcome despite 
innocence.”). 
 49.   Id. at 440–41; see also Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, 52 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 221, 221–33 (1997); Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk 
Factors and Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3 (2010).  
 50.   Eitan Elaad et al., The Effects of Prior Expectations and Outcome Knowledge on 
Polygraph Examiners’ Decisions, 7 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 279, 279–90 (1994). 
 51.   The use of cognitive heuristics is an unconscious and generally adaptive process.  All 
human beings use heuristics to navigate the world.  Without rough-and-ready rules about how to 
behave, we would be paralyzed by the vast number of choices and pieces of information we had to 
manage.  See generally GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART 
(1999). 
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Confirmation biases can also be fueled by motivational goals.52  
According to researcher Ziva Kunda, motivated reasoning occurs in the 
context of two types of goals: accuracy goals and directional goals.53  
The first relates to the need human beings have to be accurate in their 
judgments.54  The second is relevant anytime individuals seek a 
particular desired conclusion.55  Kunda argues that in order to avoid 
psychic discomfort, decision-makers maintain an “illusion of objectivity” 
that prevents them from recognizing that their cognition has been tainted 
by preference or desire.56 
In the instances where a client has confessed, motivational 
confirmation biases and a lack of resources can create a perfect storm.  A 
defense attorney who is faced with a client’s confession may well 
conclude, first, that his client committed the crime and, second, that the 
case is for all practical purposes hopeless.  Faced with limited time and a 
backlog of cases, the attorney will urge the defendant to take a plea deal.  
The attorney may develop negative feelings toward a confessing client, 
experiencing frustration at the state of the case.  She may feel that the 
client is foolish or impulsive.  If the defendant recants the confession, the 
attorney may come to believe that the client is lying to her. 
2.  Tunnel Vision 
The confirmation bias can lead defense attorneys to take a narrow 
view of their client’s situation.  In evaluating facts, the pervasive 
tendency to see new evidence as supportive of existing beliefs can also 
result in an unconscious blindness to potentially contradictory 
information, creating a kind of tunnel effect.57  A related concept in the 
psychological literature is “selective information processing,” which 
occurs when an individual overvalues information that supports a pre-
existing belief and undervalues evidence that contradicts that belief.58  
Several articles have discussed situations wherein police or prosecutors 
have focused an investigation on an individual or group of individuals 
and have viewed all evidence as increasingly suggestive of guilt for the 
                                                          
 52.   See infra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.  
 53.   Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 483 (1990). 
 54.   Id. 
 55.   Id. 
 56.   Id.  
 57.   Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in 
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 316–17 (2006). 
 58.   An Invitation to Prosecutors, supra note 45, at 517–18. 
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identified party or parties.59  Eventually these individuals were cleared, 
but only when overwhelming evidence of innocence made their 
innocence incontrovertible.60 
C.  Motivational Biases 
The term “motivational bias” refers to more than specific exogenous 
factors that may motivate defense attorneys to steer their clients toward a 
guilty plea.61  In psychology, a “motivational” factor refers to any innate 
belief or behavior as self-protective.  Examples are those that protect 
one’s ego or prevent one from feeling emotional pain or psychic 
discomfort.62  Each of the following biases can be understood from the 
perspective of the individual maintaining a positive outlook and self-
evaluation. 
1.  Overconfidence Bias 
Most human beings are overly confident in their own abilities and 
knowledge.63  David Dunning and colleagues hypothesized that the 
reason for consistent overconfidence in judgments of others is that 
individuals fail to account for the uncertainty of situational variables 
when making predictions, and therefore they do not make the appropriate 
downward adjustment to their confidence.64  A particularly robust area 
for overconfidence is in individuals’ judgments about other human 
beings.65  More than half a decade of research has shown that 
                                                          
 59.   Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49 HOW. 
L.J. 475, 479–480 (2006). 
 60.   Id. at 476–80. 
 61.   See infra notes 71–75 and accompanying text; see also Prescriptions for Ethical 
Blindness, supra note 4, at 357. 
 62.   Denial is a commonly referenced example in clinical psychology.  This was one of a 
number of “defense mechanisms” first identified by Sigmund Freud.  See ANNA FREUD, THE EGO 
AND THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENSE (1937); SIGMUND FREUD, THE NEURO-PSYCHOSES OF DEFENCE 
[sic] 41–61 (1894). 
 63.   Stephen V. Burks et al., Overconfidence and Social Signalling, 80 REV. ECON. STUD. 949, 
950 (2013).  The multidimensionality of overconfidence has been described as “(1) overestimation 
of one’s actual performance, (2) overplacement of one’s performance relative to others, and (3) 
excessive precision in one’s beliefs.”  Don A. Moore & Paul J. Healy, The Trouble with 
Overconfidence, 115 PSYCHOL. REV. 502, 502 (2008).  
 64.   David Dunning et al., The Overconfidence Effect in Social Prediction, 58 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 568 (1990). 
 65.   Id. at 568, 572 (Subjects were asked to predict the response of a target to various 
situations.  The level of familiarity with the target was manipulated.  Subjects gave overconfident 
estimates in more than 80% of all predictions across levels of familiarity.).  See also Dale W. Griffin 
et al., The Role of Construal Processes in Overconfident Predictions About the Self and Others, 59 J. 
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professionals routinely overestimate their own ability to make accurate 
judgments about others.66  This is true even when the professionals are 
psychologists, who presumably have particular insight into human 
judgment and choice. 67  Lawyers, no less than psychologists and 
individuals in other professional roles, have exhibited excessive 
confidence in their own ability to predict legal outcomes.68 
Overestimating one’s own accuracy in discerning the motivations 
and actions of criminal defendants has far-reaching implications.  Other 
biases, such as priming, anchoring, and belief perseverance set the public 
defender’s early expectations, and the confirmation bias serves to 
reinforce these beliefs.  Defense counsel is generally the only voice for 
the defendant in the criminal justice process;69 the extent to which her 
mind is open to exculpating information and alternative theories of the 
case, the more likely the innocent defendant will be to get the advocacy 
he needs.  Overconfidence bias makes the defense attorney less likely to 
question her own expectations.  It may make it less likely that she will 
reexamine her belief that her client is guilty following an eyewitness 
identification or the defendant’s confession, even when faced with 
information that could undermine her assumptions.70 
2.  Self-Serving Bias 
Self-serving bias is a tendency to interpret events in a way that is 
advantageous to oneself.71  When making judgments about what is right, 
correct, or fair, individuals tend to do so with reference to that which is 
personally flattering.72  In some cases, idiosyncratic views impacting 
                                                          
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1128, 1129 (1990). 
 66.   Stuart Oskamp, Overconfidence in Case-Study Judgments, 29 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 
261, 261–65 (1965). 
 67.   Id. 
 68.   Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to Predict Case 
Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 133, 133 (2010) (finding that “lawyers were 
overconfident in their predictions . . . .  Female lawyers were slightly better calibrated than their 
male counterparts and showed evidence of less overconfidence.”).  
 69.   See infra Part V.  
 70.   Overconfidence may also infect first-time criminal defendants when they are interacting 
with their lawyers.  Bibas argues that “[n]eophytes have plenty of room to be overconfident because 
they are unfamiliar with the justice system, whereas recidivists’ knowledge and experiences may 
limit their overconfidence.”  Shadow of Trial, supra note 34, at 2502. 
 71.   Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Symposium, Heuristics and Biases at the Bargaining 
Table, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 795, 800–01 (2004). 
 72.   Ward Farnsworth, The Legal Regulation of Self-Serving Bias, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 567, 
572 (2003) (“A claim that a judgment about fairness is self-serving typically is a counterfactual 
about a value judgment: [you] would not be arguing that outcome X is fair if it were not 
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only the decision-maker cause no exogenous harm.73  However, where 
the decision-maker’s interests diverge from other stakeholders, the self-
serving bias becomes problematic.  Take, for example, the case of the 
politician who perceives that she is more likely to be reelected if she 
votes for a bill supported by wealthy interests.  Suppose that this bill 
creates tax loopholes for the wealthy interests, leaving poorer 
constituents to pick up associated costs.  The politician may adopt a self-
serving view of the bill—minimizing the negative impact to the 
community—in order to feel comfortable voting for it.74  Similarly, a 
defense attorney is overburdened with cases, often believes that her 
client is guilty, and generally wants to stay on good terms with her 
prosecutor-colleague.75  These interests support advising her client to 
accept a plea deal.  In order to arrive at the conclusion that she can and 
should proffer this advice, she might look more favorably on a plea deal 
than she would if their interests were not relevant. 
3.  Bias Blindspot 
The various biases discussed above may interfere with a well-
meaning and otherwise ethical attorney’s ability to serve her client’s 
interest with a clear head.  Not surprisingly, research on biases has 
revealed that we have trouble perceiving our own biases.76  This 
difficulty is called “bias blind spot.”77  Emily Pronin, the psychologist 
who coined the term bias blind spot conducted a series of studies 
examining how individuals evaluated themselves and others with respect 
                                                          
advantageous to [you], or if [you] did not have a stake in the resolution of the dispute.”). 
 73.   Ward Farnsworth provides this example, “If Fred thinks the world is flat and so will not 
travel more than a hundred miles from his home, this can be regretted because presumably he would 
prefer to be well informed and not to labor under misconceptions that limit his freedom of 
movement.  If he won’t travel because he dislikes traveling, that’s different.”  Id. at 573. 
 74.   Stephan Bibas points out that “the more information people have, the more room there is 
for bias.”  Shadow of Trial, supra note 34, at 2498.  Empirical research has shown that when 
participants receive new information about the death penalty, both death penalty supporters and 
death penalty opponents interpret the same ambiguous evidence as supportive of their own preferred 
view.  See Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior 
Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2105, 
2107–08 (1979).  Problematically, indigent defendants often lack access to information, and so are 
less likely to adopt a self-serving bias at a time when this bias might spur them to reject a quick plea 
offer in favor of more process and evidence gathering.  
 75.   See infra note 116–17 and accompanying text (discussing some of the pressures facing 
public defenders). 
 76.   See Emily Pronin & Matthew B. Kugler, Valuing Thoughts, Ignoring Behavior: The 
Introspection Illusion as a Source of the Bias Blind Spot, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 565 
(2007). 
 77.   Id. at 565. 
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to biased attitudes.78  Pronin and her colleagues found that participants 
rated themselves to be less biased than others.79  Moreover, these 
participants held fast to previous judgments even after receiving 
education about how they could have been biased.80  Meanwhile, 
participants were quick to identify others’ self-serving attributions as 
skewed.81  When it comes to lawyers, much has been written about the 
tendency of members of the profession to exhibit overconfidence in a 
host of situations.82  This seemingly unflappable self-assurance may 
exacerbate the tendency of attorneys to migrate through decision 
processes without awareness of unconscious biases that are affecting 
strategic choices they help their clients make. 
4.  Behavioral Ethics & Ethical Blindness 
Behavioral ethics is a nascent field in which behavioral science is 
applied to explain why people behave in unethical ways.83  Several 
scholars, including Robert Prentice, Tigran Eldred, Jennifer Robbennolt, 
and Jean Sternlight, among others, have written about the tendency of 
certain actors to be “blind” to their own unethical practices and 
behaviors.84  Attorneys are regulated by rules of professional conduct 
                                                          
 78.   Id.; Emily Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 28 
PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 369 (2002) [hereinafter Bias Blind Spot].  
 79.   Bias Blind Spot, supra note 78, at 369–70. 
 80.   Id. at 374–76. 
 81.   Id. at 376–78. 
 82.   See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Loftus & Willem A. Wagenaar, Lawyers’ Predictions of Success, 28 
JURIMETRICS J. 437, 442–50 (1988) (discussing studies demonstrating lawyer overconfidence in 
criminal and civil litigation); see also Moore & Healy, supra note 63 (noting overconfidence as an 
explanation for litigation). 
 83.   Max H. Bazerman & Francesca Gino, Behavioral Ethics: Toward a Deeper Understanding 
of Moral Judgment and Dishonesty, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 85, 85 (2012) (“By focusing on a 
descriptive rather than a normative approach to ethics, behavioral ethics is better suited than 
traditional approaches to addressing the increasing demand from society for a deeper understanding 
of what causes even good people to cross ethical boundaries.”). 
 84.   Prescriptions for Ethical Blindness, supra note 4, at 369 (“[B]ehavioral ethics suggests an 
alternative explanation, one that is more consistent with the available research . . . [that] lawyers are 
susceptible to the forces that produce ethical blindness, which create a false experience of meeting 
professional duties, even in the face of clear evidence to the contrary.”); Robert A. Prentice, 
Behavioral Ethics: Can It Help Lawyers (and Others) Be Their Best Selves?, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 35, 36 (2015) (describing behavioral ethics as “primarily descriptive, rather 
than normative, explaining how cognitive heuristics, psychological tendencies, social and 
organizational pressures, and even seemingly irrelevant situational factors can make it more likely 
that good people will do bad things.”); Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Sternlight, Behavioral 
Legal Ethics, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 1114 (2013) [hereinafter Behavioral Legal Ethics] (quoting 
MAX H. BAZERMAN & DON A. MOORE, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 123 (7th ed. 
2008)) (“Ethical lapses occur more easily and less intentionally than we might imagine.  While most 
of us desire to act ethically, ‘psychological processes . . . [can] lead people to engage in ethically 
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that are stricter and more comprehensive than most other professions.85  
Each American jurisdiction has adopted its own rules, which typically 
include conflicts of interest, confidentiality, advising, advertising, billing, 
trust funds, and illicit relations with clients.86  However, rules at the 
national and state level are necessarily flexible, and so, are nebulous.  As 
Robbennolt and Sternlight point out, “[w]hile abundant, the ethical rules 
governing attorneys leave many gaps, and can be ambiguous and even 
conflicting.”87  In fact, the model rules themselves contain language that 
acknowledges the tension “between a lawyer’s responsibilities to clients, 
to the legal system and to the lawyer’s own interest in remaining an 
ethical person while earning a satisfactory living.”88  Together, the bias 
blind spot and ethical blindness phenomena suggest that defense lawyers 
fail to identify their own proclivity to favor a guilty plea.  Moreover, to 
the extent that a client has characteristics in common with other clients 
who have pled guilty, a public defender may implicitly presume guilt.  
These factors may help to explain findings that lawyers appointed to 
represent indigent clients do not take necessary steps to defend their 
clients.  According to one study, “appointed defense lawyers visited 
crime scenes and interviewed witnesses in only 4 percent of their cases, 
and used experts in only 2 percent,”89 leading to the conclusion that 
“[u]nderpaid, overburdened defense counsel have incentives to minimize 
the time spent on individual cases . . . .”90 
                                                          
questionable behaviors that are inconsistent with their own preferred ethics.’”); see also Guido 
Palazzo et al., Ethical Blindness, 109 J. BUS. ETHICS 323, 323–38 (2012) (arguing that ethical 
blindness, when people “behave unethically without being aware of it,” occurs as an interaction 
between “sensemaking” and “context factors”). 
 85.   Model Rules of Professional Conduct: About the Model Rules, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_profes
sional_conduct.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2016) (“The ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct were adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in 1983.  They serve as models for the ethics 
rules of most states.  Before the adoption of the Model Rules, the ABA model was the 1969 Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility.  Preceding the Model Code were the 1908 Canons of 
Professional Ethics (last amended in 1963).”). 
 86.   See, e.g., MO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-2.1 (2007) (“In representing a client, a 
lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.  In rendering 
advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, 
social, and political factors that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”). 
 87.   Behavioral Legal Ethics, supra note 84, at 1125. 
 88.   Id. (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Prologue (2010)). 
 89.   Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongful Rights, 18 CRIM. JUST., Spring 2003, at 4, 10 (internal 
citation omitted) (“[J]udges prove frequently reluctant to free state funds to finance investigations 
for those whom the judges assume are guilty.”). 
 90.   Id. 
2016 DEFENSE ATTORNEY BIAS 291 
III.  OVERWHELMED LAWYERS AND HURRIED PLEAS 
The Supreme Court has held that defendants have a right to good 
representation at all critical stages, including the plea bargaining stage.91  
But indigent defense representation is in crisis; public defenders have far 
less time and fewer resources than are necessary to provide their clients 
with decent representation.  Under pressure to move cases through, 
defense lawyers are susceptible to cognitive biases, which influence their 
assessment of their clients’ cases, and make them more likely to favor 
plea bargains.  The result is a vicious cycle—fewer resources for defense 
lawyers mean more, and more rushed plea bargains.  Meanwhile, plea 
bargaining takes place outside of the courtroom, so there is less 
oversight, which contributes to lawyering mistakes and results in fewer 
protections.  Accordingly, under the very circumstances in which 
defendants are getting less complete representation than they deserve, the 
quick plea bargain contributes to the existing inadequacies.  It is the 
perfect storm of under-representation for an underserved population. 
A.  The Right to Effective Representation at the Plea Bargaining Stage 
The right of an indigent criminal defendant to competent counsel in 
all criminal cases was established more than forty years ago in the case 
of Gideon v. Wainwright.92  In Gideon, Justice Black, writing for a 
unanimous Court, held that the framers of the Constitution placed a high 
value upon the right of the accused to wage a proper defense and that all 
Courts in the land must respect that right.93  In the years following the 
Gideon opinion, the Court was left to decide the contours of that right; it 
grappled with the question of how effective that representation had to be 
in order to meet constitutional requirements.  In Strickland v. 
Washington,94 more than twenty years after the holding in Gideon, the 
Court made clear that a defendant is entitled to more than pro forma 
representation and that; his counsel must be a “reasonably effective” 
advocate.95  However, Strickland’s protection was far from robust.  
                                                          
 91.   Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–73 (1932); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407–
08 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1387 (2012). 
 92.   372 U.S. 335 (1963).  The right to counsel in federal criminal cases was codified in the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution (and affirmed in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 
458, 462 (1938)), but it was not until Gideon that the Court incorporated this right by virtue of the 
Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Gideon, 372 U.S. at 341–43. 
 93.   Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345. 
 94.   466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 95.   Id. at 687.  The Court ruled, however, that even where defense counsel was 
 
292 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 65 
Defendants seeking relief under Strickland tended to be successful only 
in the case of actual conflicts of interest or egregious and catastrophic 
errors by counsel.96  So, for example, even in cases where a lawyer failed 
to seek potentially exculpatory DNA testing, only a quarter of defendants 
were granted a new trial.97  Lower courts have interpreted the right 
narrowly, as is clear from the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Muniz v. 
Smith,98 holding that it was not ineffective assistance of counsel when 
Muniz’s defense lawyer slept during the defendant’s cross-
examination.99 
In a companion case to Strickland, United States v. Cronic,100 the 
Court held that absence of counsel as a “critical stage” of the process 
entitles the defendant to a presumption of a constitutional violation.101  In 
2002, in Bell v. Cone,102 the Court characterized a “critical stage” as one 
that “held significant consequences for the accused.”103  Subsequent 
cases defined the plea bargaining process as one of those critical stages.  
In one such case, Hill v. Lockhart,104 the defendant pled guilty in state 
court to first-degree murder and theft of property.105  He subsequently 
sought federal habeas relief on grounds that his attorney had failed to 
advise him that he was required to serve one-half of his sentence before 
becoming eligible for parole.106  The United States Supreme Court held 
that the inmate’s allegations were insufficient to establish grounds for 
                                                          
constitutionally inadequate, a trial verdict should only be reversed when counsel’s errors materially 
prejudiced the outcome.  Id. at 693–94. 
 96.   Brandon L. Garrett, Validating the Right to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 927, 928 
(2013) [hereinafter Validating the Right to Counsel].  
 97.   GARRETT, supra note 19, at 206–07.  Garrett wrote, “One would think that those claims 
would be particularly straightforward ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  However, judges held 
that the DNA would not have made a difference-of course it did, and when they later managed to 
obtain the DNA, it cleared them.”  Validating the Right to Counsel, supra note 96, at 946. 
 98.   647 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 99.   Id. at 624–25.  In the course of the cross-examination, Muniz made statements that 
ultimately led to the admission of a State rebuttal witness as well as to the admission of a previously 
suppressed tape of a 911 call, both of which tended to incriminate Muniz.  Id. at 624.  Muniz was 
convicted of assault with intent to commit murder.  Id. at 621. 
 100.   466 U.S. 648 (1984).  
 101.   Id. at 659 n.25 (“The Court has uniformly found constitutional error without any showing 
of prejudice when counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a 
critical stage of the proceeding.  See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976); Herring v. 
New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612–13 (1972); Hamilton v. 
Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (per curiam); 
Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 475–76 (1945).”). 
 102.   535 U.S. 685 (2002). 
 103.   Id. at 695–96. 
 104.   474 U.S. 52 (1985). 
 105.   Id. at 53. 
 106.   Id. 
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habeas relief because, inter alia, he failed to argue that, had he been 
properly advised, he would have rejected the plea deal.107  In Padilla v. 
Kentucky,108 on the other hand, the Court held that a defendant had been 
denied effective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to adequately 
warn the defendant that one consequence of accepting the plea was 
deportation.109  A decade after Bell was decided, the Court reaffirmed the 
importance of a defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel 
during plea bargaining in Missouri v. Frye110 and Lafler v. Cooper.111  
Unlike Hill and Padilla, Lafler and Frye involved situations in which the 
defendant failed to accept a plea deal offered by the prosecution.112  In 
Lafler, the Court acknowledged the central importance of the decision to 
accept a plea, noting that the criminal law system “is for the most part a 
system of pleas, not a system of trials.”113 
B.  The Public Defense Crisis 
Although defendants are entitled to competent counsel for plea 
bargains, evidence suggests that, in large numbers, indigent defendants 
are not getting it.  The demands of case overloads mean that public 
defenders are forced to make tough choices and spend far less time with 
clients than would otherwise be appropriate.  In 2014, the current state of 
public defense was characterized by Attorney General Eric Holder as 
“unconscionable.”114  Comparisons of actual case workloads with 
recommended defense case workloads bring the problem into stark relief.  
In 1973, the National Advisory Council on Criminal Justice Standards 
and Goals (NAC) issued a report recommending yearly maximum 
caseloads for public defenders.  Today, these maximum caseloads are 
likely unrealistic.115  Even so, the average public defender in the U.S. 
                                                          
 107.   Id. at 54, 58–60. 
 108.   559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
 109.   Id. at 373–75. 
 110.   132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407–08 (2012). 
 111.   132 S. Ct. 1376, 1387 (2012). 
 112.   In the case of Lafler, counsel erred with respect to interpretation of the criminal code, 132 
S. Ct. at 1383, and in Frye, counsel failed to proffer the prosecutor’s offer entirely, 132 S. Ct. at 
1404. 
 113.   Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388; see also Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (internal citations omitted) 
(“Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the 
result of guilty pleas.”). 
 114.   Erik Eckholm, Public Defenders, Bolstered by a Work Analysis and Rulings, Push Back 
Against a Tide of Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/19/us/public-defenders-turn-to-lawmakers-to-try-to-ease-
caseloads.html?_r=0. 
 115.   MOTHER JONES, supra note 10 (quoting John Gross of the National Association of 
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would need to work roughly a year and a half in order to do a year’s 
worth of work.116  Managing an unmanageable number of cases means 
that public defenders must cut corners and triage, putting the most 
important cases in front of the less serious ones, and moving clients’ 
cases through as expeditiously as possible.  According to Stephen 
Hanlon, chair of an ABA advisory group on indigent defense, “[l]imited 
resources move to higher-level cases like murder and rape, and 
thousands of other defendants are simply being thrown under the bus, 
with the illusion of a lawyer.”117 
Missouri is one state where caseloads have come under some 
scrutiny.  The American Bar Association commissioned a report titled, 
The Missouri Project: A Study of the Missouri Public Defender System 
and Attorney Workload Standards, that was issued in 2014.118  The study 
involved asking public defenders to record the amount of time they spent 
on various client matters, and comparing this time with “Workload 
Standards,” which were compiled by getting a consensus about the 
number of hours that were required to perform various client functions 
adequately.119  Among other findings, the report showed that for certain 
types of felonies, the amount of time spent by Missouri public defenders 
was less than one fifth of the amount of time suggested by the workload 
standards.120  For probation violations—which can result in significant 
                                                          
Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL)) (“Many of us don’t consider them to be realistic if you expect 
quality representation.”); see also DOTTIE CARMICHAEL ET AL., PUB. POLICY RESEARCH INST., 
GUIDELINES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE CASELOADS iii, v (2015), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/2015/ls_sclaid_
summit_04_texas_study_full_report.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR INDIGENT 
DEFENSE CASELOADS]. 
Despite the age of the NAC standards, as well as the myriad of changes in the defense of 
criminal cases during the past four decades, the standards are still frequently cited as if 
the recommended numbers are a meaningful measure of maximum defense caseloads that 
an individual lawyer should be able to represent over the course of a year.  In 1973, 
however, defense lawyers handling criminal cases did not need to worry about collateral 
consequences of convictions, be familiar with a wide range of forensic evidence, or be 
called upon to represent defendants in sexually violent offender proceedings. 
Id. 
 116.   MOTHER JONES, supra note 10. 
 117.   Eckholm, supra note 114; see also GUIDELINES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE CASELOADS, 
supra note 115, at vi, ix (Hanlon is also a professor at Saint Louis University School of Law and 
provides legal representation to the Missouri State Public Defender System). 
 118.   RUBIN BROWN, STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, THE 
MISSOURI PROJECT: A STUDY OF THE MISSOURI PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM AND ATTORNEY 
WORKLOAD STANDARDS 2 (2014), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/2014/ls_sclaid_
5c_the_missouri_project_report.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 119.   Id. at 5–7. 
 120.   For C/D felonies, public defenders spent 4.4 hours, while the recommended number of 
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consequences—the study found that defenders in Missouri spent less 
than an hour-and-a-half all told, when the recommended time was close 
to ten hours.121  In the same year that the report was issued, Stephen 
Reynolds, chief of the Saint Louis County Public Defender’s office noted 
that some lawyers “were carrying more than [two hundred] felony cases, 
from drugs to rape and murder.”122  About that load, Reynolds remarked, 
“I don’t think there’s any attorney who can handle that, no matter how 
good you are.”123  With felony cases in the hundreds, public defenders 
cannot make clear-headed decisions about whether to urge their clients to 
take a plea; plea deals are a matter of survival. 
C. Crisis Managed: The “Meet ’Em and Plead ’Em” Culture 
U.S. District Court Judge Jed Rakoff has argued that the war on 
crime, so-called “three strikes” laws, and mandatory minimums have 
increased the stakes for trials for which public defenders have few 
resources—ratcheting up the pressure to accept whatever plea is 
offered.124  According to Rakoff, 
the direct result [of heavier sentences] was to increase greatly the 
percentage of criminal cases resolved by guilty pleas . . . .  The indirect 
results were to move primary responsibility for sentencing from the 
courts to the prosecutors and, concomitantly, to move the locus of the 
resolution of most criminal cases from the public forum of the 
courtroom to the private venue of the prosecutor’s office.125 
The vast majority of cases are disposed by virtue of guilty pleas.126  
The practice of pleading out a client quickly and with little investigation 
or deliberation or even communication has been dubbed, “meet ’em and 
plead ’em.” 127  One public defender described the process this way: 
                                                          
hours was twenty five.  Id. at 6, 15–17.  For A/B felonies, the workload recommendation was 47.6, 
as opposed to 8.7, the actual average hours spent.  Id. 
 121.   Time spent was 1.4 hours, while the recommendation was 9.8 hours.  Id. 
 122.   Eckholm, supra note 114. 
 123.   Id. 
 124.   Jed S. Rakoff, Mass Incarceration: The Silence of the Judges, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 21, 
2015), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/05/21/mass-incarceration-silence-judges/; Jed S. 
Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/; see also Jed S. 
Rakoff, Frye and Lafler: Bearers of Mixed Messages, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 25, 25–26 (2012) 
[hereinafter Frye and Lafler] (discussing the impact of the Supreme Court decisions on plea 
bargaining). 
 125.   Frye and Lafler, supra note 124, at 25–26. 
 126.   See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012). 
 127.   MOTHER JONES, supra note 10. 
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A defense attorney arrives in court to represent a new client.  She is 
given a cursory police report and/or complaint.  If the attorney is lucky, 
she may have an opportunity to view . . . the client’s criminal history.  
The state makes an offer to the new client, and it sounds decent.  . . .  
Perhaps the offer is prison time, but by the defense attorney’s 
understanding of the criminal history, the offer is a lot less time than 
the client would be facing at trial. 
The defense attorney goes back to the holding cell and meets the client 
for the first time.  She introduces herself as the attorney appointed to 
represent him, lets him know the charges . . . .  If defense counsel is 
lucky, she will not have to yell over the other noise of similar 
conversations between countless other attorneys and incarcerated 
individuals. . . .  [She] informs [the client] that the state has offered a 
pretty good plea agreement.  “You can take the deal now and get this 
over with,” she tells him.128 
According to Tanya Greene, an ACLU attorney and capital public 
defender, the primary reason for a large number of accepted plea deals is 
because of busy defenders prioritizing the most serious offenses and 
pressuring other clients to accept deals.129  “You’ve got so many cases, 
limited resources, and there’s no relief,” Greene says. “You go to work, 
you get more cases.  You have to triage.”130  In November of 2008, 
public defenders’ offices in seven states protested overwhelming 
workloads, claiming that “the demanding pace of representation ha[d] 
made the work of these public defenders a ‘plea bargain assembly line,’ 
[resulting in] ‘less justice and more McJustice.’”131 
The assembly line analogy stands in stark contrast to the protections 
envisioned by the authors of the Sixth Amendment trial right, as well as 
the Fifth and Fourteenth due process rights.132  Together, these elements 
of the Bill of Rights have been interpreted to provide targets of the 
government—particularly those targets who are most vulnerable—with 
                                                          
 128.   CeCelia Valentine, Meet ’Em and Plead ’Em: Is This the Best Practice?, CHAMPION (June 
2013), http://www.nacdl.org/Champion.aspx?id=28953. 
 129.   MOTHER JONES, supra note 10. 
 130.   Id. 
 131.   Anchors Away, supra note 36, at 1688–89 (quoting Appleman, supra note 36). 
 132.   “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for 
his [defense].”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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adequate tools to wield a defense against a more powerful state.  In 
keeping with this notion, Stephanos Bibas argues that “[t]he Sixth 
Amendment presupposes a vigorous, effective adversarial system to test 
not only defendants’ factual guilt but also their culpability and the 
sentences they deserve.”133  Although public defenders periodically 
attempt to change the status quo, these efforts have been largely 
unsuccessful.134  There are a small number of notable exceptions.  In 
2012 and 2013, the state Supreme Courts in Missouri and Florida upheld 
the right of public defenders in those states to refuse to take non-capital 
cases, citing a lack of adequate resources.135 Florida’s highest state court 
observed that “[a]ttorneys are routinely unable to interview clients, 
conduct investigations, take depositions, prepare mitigation, or counsel 
clients about pleas offered at arraignment.  Instead, the office engages in 
‘triage’ with the clients who are in custody or who face the most serious 
charges getting priority to the detriment of the other clients.”136  
However, the number of successful refusals is dwarfed by the magnitude 
of the problem, leading to questions about the legitimacy of the criminal 
justice system as a whole.  After all, liberal political theory dictates that 
legal processes are only legitimate if they are acceptable to those who are 
bound by them.137 
D. Behind Closed Doors: How the Plea Magnifies Error 
Current deficits in the public defense system increase the chances 
that defense lawyers will strike bad deals.138  Away from the eyes of 
potential critics, rushed, understaffed, and poorly incentivized—public 
defenders are ideal candidates for cognitive biases.  The indigent defense 
criminal system is a breeding ground for hastily formed impressions, 
                                                          
 133.   Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 150, 169 (2012) [hereinafter Incompetent Plea Bargaining]. 
 134.   In Missouri, the state Supreme Court noted the Missouri Public Defender Commission’s 
efforts to correct this: 
The commission promulgated 18 CSR 10-4.010 in response to mounting concern that, 
due to the growth in the number and complexity of cases requiring public defender 
services without a corresponding increase in the number of public defenders, some public 
defenders’ caseloads had increased to a level that interfered with their ability to fulfill 
their constitutional, statutory and ethical obligations to represent their clients effectively 
and competently.  
State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 599 (Mo. 2012).  
 135.   Id. at 611–12; Pub. Def. v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 274 (Fla. 2013).   
 136.   Pub. Def., 115 So. 3d at 274.   
 137.   JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 144–50 (1993). 
 138.   Incompetent Plea Bargaining, supra note 133, at 152 (noting “the massive underfunding 
and overwork that plague indigent defense counsel.”).   
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rushed decisions, and questionable outcomes.  Whereas the courtroom 
may provide a criminal defendant some additional due process and 
protection from shoddy or harried lawyering, the plea bargain process 
does little to illuminate constitutional blunders.139  There appears to be no 
end in sight, in spite of Judge Rakoff’s observation that “a criminal 
justice system operating largely behind closed doors is both inconsistent 
with the traditions of a free society and an invitation for abuse.”140  
Ironically, the same pressures that lead to lawyering mistakes 
(oversights, missed deadlines, lack of investigation) also help to 
perpetuate plea bargains. 
Evidence suggests that some prosecutors exploit the system of 
sloppy justice by engaging in upcharging and overcharging, and using 
various techniques such as anchoring to increase the palatability of an 
offer.141  Threats are often part of a prosecutor’s arsenal as well.  One 
judge remarked: 
Underlying many plea negotiations is the understanding—or threat—
that if the defendant goes to trial and is convicted he will be dealt with 
more harshly than would be the case if he had pleaded guilty.  An 
innocent defendant might be persuaded that the harsher sentence he 
must face if he is unable to prove his innocence at trial means that it is 
to his best interest to plead guilty despite his innocence.142 
A number of observers have commented on the propensity for 
prosecutors to make errors in decisions about whom and what to charge.  
Prosecutors, like other human beings, are subject to cognitive errors that 
can influence their perception of targets of an investigation.  These errors 
make a defendant seem more culpable, and can even lead a prosecutor to 
target the wrong person.143  A plea bargain effectively strengthens and 
confirms any biased judgments that may exist in the preliminary stages 
of pretrial preparation.  Because there is no trial, the standard of proof 
applied by the architects of the deal is unknown, and the results are 
                                                          
 139.   See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime 
but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1842, 1852 (1994) (noting instances in which even in 
the context of a trial, lawyers have performed abysmally).  
 140.   Frye and Lafler, supra note 124, at 26; see also Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in 
Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 
682–83 (2007) (discussing reasons for allowing appellate attorneys to raise ineffective assistance of 
counsel arguments during appeals). 
 141.   See Shadow of Trial, supra note 34, and accompanying text. 
 142.   Ralph Adam Fine, Plea Bargaining: An Unnecessary Evil, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 615, 622 
(1987) (quoting U.S. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COURTS 43 (1973)). 
 143.   See infra notes 219–25 and accompanying text (identifying biases influencing defense 
attorneys and prosecutors alike); see Kertscher, supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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largely irreversible.  As Justice Scalia noted, in comparing pleas to trial, 
a jury trial is “the 24-karat test of fairness,” and “the best thing [that] our 
legal system” has to offer.144  By and large, the process that leads to a 
defendant’s penalty falls far short of this. 
E.  Courts Protect Plea Bargain System 
In spite of widespread acknowledgment of an inadequate system of 
indigent representation and acceptance that plea deals are the rule, rather 
than the exception, “the Supreme Court has usually treated plea 
bargaining as an afterthought, doing little to regulate it.”145  In fact, when 
the Court has considered the practice, it has been supportive of the 
current state of affairs.  Nancy Jean King argues that the Court’s 
interpretation of the Constitution expanded to afford criminal defendants 
more technical protection and that the Court then turned a blind eye to 
inadequacies and shortcomings that denied defendants the very 
protection the Court purported to find.146  The Court has called plea 
bargains “important components of this country’s criminal justice 
system,”147 and has characterized such deals as “essential” and “highly 
desirable part[s]” of the criminal process that lead to “prompt and largely 
final disposition of most criminal cases.”148  Courts do not control the 
amount of funding available for indigent defense, and there is little that 
they can do to influence legislatures.  As a result, there is little courts can 
do to address flaws in the system, short of overturning pleas and 
convictions.  Meanwhile, as Chief Justice Burger noted, “If every 
criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the 
Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number 
of judges and court facilities.”149 
The Justices on the Supreme Court are all too aware of the pressures 
facing lower courts.  For decades, observers of courts and judges alike 
have been writing about the tendency of trial courts to have overloaded 
                                                          
 144.   Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012) (No. 10-209), 
2011 WL 5131273. 
 145.   Incompetent Plea Bargaining, supra note 133, at 150; see also MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, 
THE POLICE POWER 179 (2005) (“The plea bargaining process is governed by very few, if any, 
principles, with the blessing of the Supreme Court which has turned a blind constitutional eye.”). 
 146.   Nancy Jean King, Priceless Process: Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal Litigation, 47 
UCLA L. REV. 113, 122–23 (1999) (identifying the “due process revolution” as a mechanism that 
led to the Court’s “endorsement in the 1970s of plea bargaining itself.”). 
 147.   Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977). 
 148.   Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971). 
 149.   Id. at 260. 
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dockets.150  Trial court judges who preside over a large number of cases 
are not well positioned to stem the tide of hastily negotiated plea deals.  
In fact, the motivations created by limited resources in the criminal 
justice system are similar to those of prosecutors and the criminal 
defense bar.  Bibas notes that “[t]rial judges have strong incentives to 
clear their own dockets by encouraging defendants to accept deals and 
making those deals bulletproof.”151  Because these deals are offered, 
discussed, and negotiated behind closed doors, judges often have little 
information upon which to determine whether the decision to accept is 
truly a defendant-informed one. 
IV.  THE PROBLEM OF INNOCENCE 
One of the most compelling arguments for a change in the system is 
the fact that innocent defendants accept plea deals.  DNA exonerations 
are clear evidence that criminal defendants do sometimes agree to serve 
time when they are innocent.152  It may be perfectly rational for an 
innocent defendant to accept a plea.  In situations in which the prosecutor 
appears convinced of the defendant’s guilt and the defense lawyer is 
doing little to fight for him, he may conclude that his best option is to cut 
his losses and take whatever deal the prosecutor is offering.  In such an 
instance, the defendant’s compliance is administratively convenient, but 
it does not serve the interest of justice.153  A criminal trial puts the burden 
                                                          
 150.   More than thirty-five years ago, Judge William Schwarzer, a federal judge for the 
Northern District of California, wrote about the feasibility of trial judge oversight of defense 
counsel.  William W. Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent Counsel—the Trial Judge’s Role, 93 
HARV. L. REV. 633, 633, 665 (1980).  He asked:  
Is it realistic to expect a judge, heavily burdened with a growing backlog of criminal 
cases, to indulge in the apparent luxury of pretrial conferences, sua sponte inquiries into 
the adequacy of counsel’s preparation, and consideration of objections, defenses and 
posttrial motions?  Even if these proposals are feasible in courts having light dockets, 
how could they be applied in large metropolitan courts where criminal cases are 
dispatched on an assembly line basis?  
Id. at 665.  See also Janet Stidman Eveleth, Dispute Resolution Comes of Age, 36 MD. B.J., 
July/August 2003, at 1, 4 (observing that in Maryland, “[w]ell over two million cases are filed in the 
state’s trial courts every year, burdening courts with overloaded dockets.”); McCoy v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 59 S.W.3d 793, 801 (Tex. 2001) (noting that Texas trial courts have authority to limit 
voir dire examinations in order to manage over-burdened dockets); Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the 
Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on the Frontier of the Inherent Power, 91 
IOWA L. REV. 1147, 1154, 1157 (2006) (remarking on “congestion” in federal courts). 
 151.   Incompetent Plea Bargaining, supra note 133, at 165. 
 152.   Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 73–75 (2008) (noting 
that nine people out of a two-hundred person sample pleaded guilty to either rape and/or rape and 
were later exonerated through DNA testing); see Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and 
Guilty Pleas, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 205, 216 (1999) [hereinafter Reconciling Loss Aversion]. 
 153.   The prosecutor is charged with seeking justice, the people’s interest is a fair system that 
 
2016 DEFENSE ATTORNEY BIAS 301 
of proof on the state, and because trial preparation involves information 
gathering, going to trial provides the opportunity for the truth to become 
clear, even if it was obscured at an earlier stage. 
Research into the phenomenon of false confessions provides some 
clues as to what pressures lead to false admissions of guilt.154  Saul 
Kassin and other social psychologists have studied the false confession 
context extensively, and through empirical studies, these researchers 
have demonstrated that it is surprisingly easy to get someone to confess 
to a “crime” he or she did not commit.155  Through careful 
experimentation and analysis, these researchers have been able to 
identify situational pressures that lead to false confessions.  The 
pressures include a desire to escape from a bad situation, the urging of an 
influential person, and the feeling of a loss of control.156  Often these 
factors are present for the indigent defendant who is facing serious 
criminal charges. 
A.  Pressures and the Compliant Defendant 
In the plea deal context, criminal defendants face a host of pressures 
that together, can lead them to accept deals offered by a prosecutor.157  In 
fact, when investigative (interview) techniques have led a defendant to 
confess, that defendant is more likely to accept a plea and offer a false 
admission.  Researchers Drizin and Leo compiled 125 false confession 
cases and found that of those 18- to 24-year-old defendants who were 
prosecuted, 27% had pled guilty.158  Empirical evidence demonstrates 
                                                          
accurately sorts the innocent from the defendant, and the defense lawyer’s interest is in zealous and 
successful representation. 
 154.   Saul M. Kassin & Rebecca J. Norwick, Why People Waive Their Miranda Rights: The 
Power of Innocence, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 211, 211–21 (2004) [hereinafter Why People Waive 
Their Miranda Rights] (finding in a mock crime experiment that innocent suspects are more likely to 
waive their Miranda rights to silence and to counsel even when in the presence of an officer who 
appears guilt-presumptive, hostile, and closed-minded). 
 155.   Individual differences notwithstanding, there are two structural aspects of a typical police 
interrogation that are striking to this social psychologist.  Saul M. Kassin, False Confessions: 
Causes, Consequences, and Implications for Reform, 1 POL’Y INSIGHTS FROM BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 
112, 115 (2014).  The first concerns the fact that “interrogation is by definition a guilt-presumptive 
social interaction led by an authority figure who has formed a strong belief about the suspect,” 
sometimes through a pre-interrogation interview, and “who single-mindedly measures success” by 
whether he or she is able to extract a confession.  Id.  “The guilt-presumption that marks the start of 
interrogation thus provides fertile ground for the operation of cognitive and behavioral confirmation 
biases.”  Id. 
 156.   See generally Jennifer T. Perillo & Saul M. Kassin, Inside Interrogation: The Lie, the 
Bluff, and False Confessions, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 327 (2011). 
 157.   See Why People Waive Their Miranda Rights, supra note 154, at 218.  
 158.   Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA 
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that incriminating evidence—even when the evidence is suspect—
influences perceptions of guilt.  For example, one mock-juror study by 
Kukucka and Kassin revealed that knowledge of a recanted confession 
can taint evaluations of handwriting evidence.159  When told that the 
defendant had confessed—even though he later retracted his confession, 
claiming it was coerced—participants perceived the handwriting samples 
as more similar and were more likely to conclude, erroneously, that they 
were authored by the same individual.160  Research on the confirmation 
bias and the effects of false confessions on subsequent beliefs of mock 
jurors and investigators suggest the possibility that confessions can 
corrupt other evidence.  The same assumptions and biases that influence 
jurors can work on a defendant’s own lawyer.  So a public defender who 
has a confessing client may be more likely to believe the client is guilty 
and will be disinclined to spend time and resources to investigate.  The 
Innocence Project has reported on more than 300 such post-conviction 
DNA exonerations, all involving rape or murder.161 
Because of the constraints facing both prosecutors and defense 
lawyers, pretrial information gathering and negotiations do not 
adequately sort guilty and innocent defendants.162  One theory explaining 
the sorting problem involves the idea of “pooling.”163  Bob Scott and Bill 
Stuntz coined the phrase pooling in the context of prosecutorial decision-
making.164  Prosecutors typically process a large number of cases.  Like 
defense attorneys, they lack adequate resources to investigate all (or even 
most) claims of innocence.  If prosecutors were to take defendants at 
their word, they would be forced to drop most charges.  Faced with two 
unworkable options—fully investigating or dropping charges—
prosecutors do the predictable, and treat guilty and innocent defendants 
                                                          
World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 945 (2004) [hereinafter The Problem of False Confessions].  
 159.   Jeff Kukucka & Saul M. Kassin, Do Confessions Taint Perceptions of Handwriting 
Evidence?: An Empirical Test of the Forensic Confirmation Bias, 38 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 256, 
265–67 (2014).  
 160.   Id. 
 161.   DNA Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2016).  
In nearly 30% of these cases, false confessions were a contributing factor—and this sample 
represents only a fraction of all wrongful convictions.  Id.  See also GARRETT, supra note 19. 
 162.   See MARGARET A. NEALE & MAX H. BAZERMAN, COGNITION AND RATIONALITY IN 
NEGOTIATION 170–72 (1991); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Social Psychology, Information 
Processing, and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 163, 182 (2007) [hereinafter Social Psychology 
Information Processing]. 
 163.   Plea Bargaining as Contract, supra note 2, at 1911. 
 164.   See id. at 1947. 
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alike.165  The similar treatment for all defendants means that there is “no 
downward innocence adjustment.”166  Defense attorneys also tend to treat 
similarly situated clients similarly.167  Good criminal defense attorneys 
make initial assessments about how to prioritize cases—so some initial 
sorting is done—but once they have decided on an appropriate course of 
action, severe time constraints as well as confirmation (and related) 
biases suggest that they are unlikely to do additional investigation.168 
B.  Lawyer as Counselor & Arm-Twister 
Once a defense lawyer has decided that a plea is acceptable, she 
communicates the deal to her client.  At that point, ostensibly, the 
lawyer’s job is to counsel her client.  The term “counselor” is rooted in 
the idea that the lawyer advises the client, while the client makes the 
decisions.  The ABA defines the role this way: “As advisor, a lawyer 
provides a client with an informed understanding of the client’s legal 
rights and obligations and explains their practical implications.”169  
Courts have reinforced this notion in their opinions, defining the 
obligation of the criminal defense lawyer as limited to providing the 
client with reasonable options from which the client may choose.170  The 
notion that the client should be in charge of important decisions has been 
central to a number of Supreme Court decisions.  The Court has 
acknowledged that criminal defendants have more than an interest—they 
have the right to control the disposition of their case.171 
 
                                                          
 165.   See id. at 1947, 1952–53. 
 166.   Id. at 1947. 
 167.   See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, A Reply: Imperfect Bargains, Imperfect Trials, 
and Innocent Defendants, 101 YALE L.J. 2011, 2012 (1992)(speaking generally about the fact that 
“the pooling problem we have identified goes to the core function of the process: its ability to 
separate the innocent from the guilty.”) 
 168.   Id. at 176–77 (arguing that “defense lawyers, especially those whose clients are 
incarcerated or who have an indictment hanging over them, may be eager to get charges resolved.”). 
 169.   MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble & Scope, cl. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 170.   See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Crime, Confession, and the Counselor-at-Law: Lessons from 
Dostoyevsky, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 327, 329–30 (1998) (describing State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357, 363 
(Utah 1994) (Stewart, J., concurring)) (“Justices Stewart and Durham of the Utah Supreme Court . . . 
stated, ‘[i]t is not the role of defense counsel to persuade a defendant to plead guilty because counsel 
concludes that the defendant committed a crime.’  Such a role would ‘nullify our adversarial system 
and . . . deny the defendant the effective assistance of counsel.’  The justices suggested that defense 
counsel should merely explain the options to the client and allow the client to choose whether to 
plead guilty.”). 
 171.   See, e.g., Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1966) (holding that counsel cannot waive 
the decision whether to plead guilty or hold the government to its burden of proof at trial over the 
defendant’s objection).  
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In spite of the mandates of the American Bar Association and the 
Supreme Court, lawyers who represent indigent criminal defendants 
sometimes exert considerable pressure on the client to accept a plea.  The 
pressure that comes from a defendant’s own lawyer may be the most 
influential.172  The practice of using psychological pressure to get clients 
to plead is well represented in legal scholarship.  Scholar-practitioners 
have pondered the ethical implications of various tactics to convince 
clients to go to trial.173  Some of these tactics include: enlisting “capital 
experts” who will recount stories of trials that culminated in death 
sentences, getting family members to implore the client to take a plea to 
spare the family, and using religion as a basis for arguing that the 
defendant could be making a difference for fellow prisoners.174  Abbe 
Smith argues in favor of “using a considerable amount of persuasion to 
convince the client that a plea which the client instinctively disfavors is, 
in fact, in his or her best interest.”175  She goes on to note that the 
“persuasion is most often needed to convince the client that s/he should 
plead guilty in a case in which a not guilty plea would be destructive.”176 
There is wide-spread acceptance of strong-arm tactics in influencing 
defendants to accept plea deals.177  However, some observers have called 
these tactics into question.178  One concern is that a harried defense 
attorney often does not have the time to discern whether her client could 
be cleared of the charges with additional investigation and evidence-
                                                          
 172.   Some efforts have been made to shift the focus to a model of client choice.  A well-known 
example is DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A 
CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977) (joined by Paul Bergman in the text’s second edition) 
[hereinafter BINDER & PRICE].  A central theme is client decision-making.  For a discussion of this 
approach, see Alexander Scherr, Lawyers and Decisions: A Model of Practical Judgment, 47 VILL. 
L. REV. 161, 190 (2002). 
 173.   This author has not found examples of attorneys discussing psychological tactics and 
pressure to convince defendants to give up the deal to go to trial.  
 174.   Abbe Smith, The Lawyer’s “Conscience” and the Limits of Persuasion, 36 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 479, 485–87 (2007) (citing Kevin M. Doyle, Heart of the Deal: Ten Suggestions for Plea 
Bargaining, 23 CHAMPION, Nov. 1999, at 68, 70). 
 175.   Id. at 481 (citing ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL 5 FOR THE DEFENSE OF 
CRIMINAL CASES § 201, at 339 (5th ed. 1988)).  
 176.   Id.  See also The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, supra note 2, at 1309 
(noting that under the American guilty plea system, “the line between advice and coercion seems 
virtually nonexistent” because “accurate advice is almost always coercive”). 
 177.   See infra notes 179–83 and accompanying text. 
 178.   Peter W. Tague, Guilty Pleas and Barristers’ Incentives: Lessons from England, 20 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 287, 287 (2007) (“Criminal defense lawyers in the United States sometimes 
pressure clients to plead guilty.  The purpose could be defensible, even laudable: to eliminate the risk 
that the defendant, guilty or provably so, would be sanctioned much more harshly if convicted at 
trial.  The purpose could also be pernicious: to advance the lawyer’s interests when it would be 
‘better’ for the defendant to contest guilt.”) (citations omitted). 
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gathering.  The defendant who holds out may have information that 
could clear him, or he may be aware of weaknesses in the prosecutor’s 
case—information to which the attorney does not, at the initial stages, 
have access.  Because the attorney controls communication with the 
prosecutor, has access to the file, and possesses greater familiarity with 
the process her influence is profound.  The average indigent defendant 
sitting in jail awaiting trial is not even able to decide when and how often 
to meet with his lawyer—he must wait for her to initiate contact.179 
A criminal defendant who has little hope of receiving significant 
attention from his lawyer beyond communication urging him to accept a 
deal and who has nobody else in his corner with means to fight for him 
may conclude that a deal is his only option.  He may reach this 
conclusion even if he knows he is innocent of the charges.  The current 
“meet ‘em and plead ‘em culture” dis-incentivizes public defenders to 
investigate claims of innocence.180  It simultaneously perpetuates a 
system in which innocent defendants are incentivized to admit false guilt.  
As prominent Judge Frank Easterbrook has noted, “[p]ersons at risk of 
unjust conviction may prefer a certain (but low) punishment in a plea 
bargain to the risk of conviction and high punishment after trial.”181  One 
extensive study of plea bargaining found that uncounseled defendants 
who are not guilty may choose to obtain concessions by pleading 
guilty.182  Meanwhile, examples of innocent people being punished 
abound.  The “Rampart” scandal in Los Angeles, California and another 
in Tulia, Texas, are two examples suggesting that, “at least under certain 
conditions, wrongly accused innocent defendants routinely plead 
guilty.”183 
                                                          
 179.   See Perisha Wallace, No Equal Justice for the Poor: Mississippi’s Failed Attempt to Honor 
Right to Counsel Mandates, 9 S. J. POL’Y & JUST. L.J. 81, 87 (2015) (providing the example of a 
defendant who could not afford bail and remained in jail for over eleven months without receiving a 
single visit from a lawyer); Eve Brensike Primus, The Illusory Right to Counsel, 37 OHIO N.U. L. 
REV. 597, 601 (2011) (“In many jurisdictions, attorneys routinely meet their clients for the first time 
on the trial court date.”). 
 180.   Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, (Nov. 20, 2014), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/.  Drizin and Leo 
assembled for analysis 125 false confession cases and found that of those 18- to 24-year-old 
defendants who were prosecuted, 27% had pled guilty. The Problem of False Confessions, supra 
note 158, at 945.  
 181.   Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1969 (1992) 
(agreeing with Scott and Stuntz, who “are concerned that the innocent cannot adequately identify 
themselves in the bargaining process, so they may not receive the discount their status implies.”). 
 182.   See DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE 
WITHOUT TRIAL 200–05, 225–26 (1966).  
 183.   Russell D. Covey, Plea-Bargaining Law After Lafler and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 595, 616 
(2013). 
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In both Rampart and Tulia, large numbers of prisoners were exonerated 
after it was discovered that law enforcement officials had engaged in 
large-scale misconduct causing the wrongful conviction of scores of 
innocent persons.  Police misconduct ranged from the planting of false 
evidence to police perjury.  In those two scandals, of sixty four actually 
innocent exonerees, 81%, or 52 out of 64, pled guilty after having been 
falsely accused of engaging in criminal conduct by untruthful police 
officers.184 
Even in the case of criminal defendants who are guilty of some 
chargeable offense, distracted lawyering, pressure to plead and little 
oversight lead to concerns about whether the plea deals capture the right 
amount of punishment. 
V.  THE DECISION: WHOSE CHOICE? 
Indigent criminal defendants accept plea deals in the vast majority of 
all cases.  They surrender their right to a trial in exchange for a promise 
of some measure of leniency.185  In so doing, they forfeit the right to 
make the state prove its case, and they agree to probation or prison time, 
and all of the consequences that go along with the resulting conviction.186  
As a result, “plea bargaining substitutes the values of administrative 
efficiency in the criminal process for the values of trial.”187  The 
lawyer—most often a public defender—moves on to the next client.  
Meanwhile, the defendant is left to deal with the fallout; it is the 
defendant, and not his lawyer, who lives with the consequences of the 
decision to accept the deal. 
                                                          
 184.   Id. (citations omitted). 
 185.   Because of the potential for strategic charging decisions, it is difficult to say in all cases 
whether the defendant actually receives a good bargain.  Were the case to go to trial, the prosecutor 
would have to charge only what she could prove, and this is not truly tested pretrial. 
 186.   In addition to giving up the right to a trial and trial protections offered through the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the possibility of acquittal, and often the assurance 
of punishment ranging from time in prison, to probation, to fines, a defendant will experience 
“collateral consequences.”  The American Bar Association defines collateral consequences as 
“opportunities and benefits that are no longer fully available to a person, or legal restrictions a 
person may operate under, because of their criminal conviction.”  User Guide Frequently Asked 
Questions, ABA NAT’L INVENTORY COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES CONVICTION, 
http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/user_guide/#q01 (last visited Oct. 9, 2016).  Well-known 
examples are the loss of the right to vote, and the placement of a convict’s name on the sex offender 
registry.  See id. 
 187.   The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387, 1405 (1970).  
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A.  Lawyer Bias and the Rush to the Deal 
No doubt, the majority of lawyers who represent indigent defendants 
counsel them to accept a deal only when to do so seems like a reasonably 
good option.  But what seems like a good option to a defense lawyer may 
be influenced by a number of factors; of the various factors that 
explicitly or implicitly influence defense attorneys, not all are specific to 
that client, and not all should be considerations in the case of a given 
defendant.  Facing too many clients and too little time, defense attorneys 
have to weigh the needs of clients against each other, make guesses 
about what they might find if they had more resources for investigation, 
and strike a reasonable balance between personal life and professional 
goals.  Even a diligent public defender can be influenced by motivational 
biases that make a wheel-and-deal system of criminal justice seem more 
palatable.  Most biases influencing public defenders point in a single 
direction: toward the speedy disposition of a case in a plea deal. 
Even in cases in which the defense attorney is diligent and well-
intentioned, taking control of the decision to plead guilty can deprive a 
criminal defendant of a chance he would not otherwise have had.  In fact, 
some of the value of going to trial is the preparation; even a mediocre 
defense attorney will do some investigation and planning in preparation 
for trial, and this may turn up mitigating or exculpatory evidence.  There 
are at least three reasons why proceeding to trial can advantage a 
defendant.  The first is that trial preparation can expose weaknesses in 
the prosecution’s case.  The second is that a trial is more likely to serve 
as a check on bad defense lawyers—forcing them to do the work they 
would otherwise avoid, and in the event that they do not, exposing their 
inadequacies.  The third is that the credible threat of having to prove the 
case may impact a prosecutor’s view of the case.  According to Judge 
Rakoff, “[M]ost of the unfairness that occurs during the plea-bargaining 
process is, in my experience, . . . the result of overconfidence on the part 
of prosecutors, whose evidence and sources, having never been put to the 
test of a trial, appear much stronger . . . than is objectively warranted.”188 
 
 
                                                          
 188.   Frye and Lafler, supra note 124, at 26 (“For example, a prosecutor, intent on ensnaring as 
many defendants as possible, is often more prone to credit a cooperator’s testimony than a jury that 
has heard the cooperator cross-examined by effective defense counsel would be.”). 
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B.  Court Preference for Lawyer Choices 
Although the framers of the Constitution envisioned a criminal 
justice system with checks on lawyers,189 courts have migrated away 
from this initial skepticism, holding that the attorney retains ultimate 
control over many decisions, “even when the defendant expresse[s] a 
contrary wish to his lawyer.”190  One example is the case of Haynes v. 
Cain,191 in which the defendant was charged with first-degree murder.192  
The government’s theory—and burden of proof under the relevant 
criminal code—was that the defendant had intentionally killed the victim 
during the course of a rape or robbery.193  Although the charge was a 
death penalty-eligible offense, and the defendant strenuously objected, 
defense counsel conceded that his client had committed the rape-robbery, 
arguing that the defendant was guilty of second-degree murder, and 
should be spared the death penalty.194  The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, 
held that defense counsel’s refusal to comply with his client’s wishes did 
not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.195  In United States v. 
Burke, the Eleventh Circuit, the court said, 
Defense counsel in a criminal trial is more than an adviser to a client 
with the client’s having the final say at each point. . . .  [H]is chief 




                                                          
 189.   Erica J. Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy: The Criminal Defendant’s Right to Control 
the Case, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1147, 1166 (2010) [hereinafter Resurrecting Autonomy] (citations 
omitted) (“The suspicion of lawyers arose at least in part from the fact that after the Revolution, 
there was a dearth of high quality lawyers in practice since many had returned to England or had left 
practice to become active in politics or to serve on the bench.  Second, lawyers were associated with 
the upper class, and those who were poor often could not afford lawyers.”).  See also Faretta v. 
California, 422 U.S. 806, 826 (1975) (“The colonists brought with them an appreciation of the virtues 
of self-reliance and a traditional distrust of lawyers.”). 
 190.   United States v. Burke, 257 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2001).  The 11th Circuit thought 
that it was sufficient to note that “[w]hen the defendant is given the last word about how his case 
will be tried, the defendant becomes his own trial lawyer,” and used this rationale as a clear basis for 
limiting defendant involvement in retrial and trial decisions.  Id. at 1323–24.  The court held that the 
decision to request a mistrial was a tactical decision that fell within “the province of defense 
counsel” and was not a fundamental decision that belonged to the defendant.  Id. at 1324. 
 191.   298 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 192.   Id. at 377. 
 193.   Id. 
 194.   Id. at 377–78. 
 195.   Id. at 382–83 (holding that Haynes failed to overcome the prejudice prong of the 
Strickland test due to what the court described as “overwhelming evidence” against Haynes).  
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. . .  [T]he adversarial system becomes less effective as the opinions of 
lay persons are substituted for the judgment of legally trained 
counsel.196 
The Supreme Court has similarly expressed a preference for counsel-
led criminal defense.  With respect to cases in which the defendant 
wishes to represent himself, the Court has said, “[a]lthough we found in 
Faretta that the right to defend oneself at trial is ‘fundamental’ in nature, 
it is clear that it is representation by counsel that is the standard, not the 
exception.”197  The Court has compared a defendant’s courtroom efforts 
disfavorably to that of a lawyer’s,198 arguing that “to decide what issues 
are to be pressed . . . seriously undermines the ability of counsel to 
present the client’s case in accord with counsel’s professional 
evaluation.”199 
Supreme Court jurisprudence has, in multiple instances, viewed 
defendants’ choices regarding trial strategy to be misguided and 
uninformed.  The highest Court has gone so far as to concur with 
comments from the ABA suggesting that criminal defendants might not 
even have the capacity to understand trial rights.200  The notion that a 
defendant cannot understand protections captured by the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments is important, because these are the areas the Court has 
identified as fundamental rights, belonging to the defendant.  These 
rights include whether to waive the right to a jury trial,201 whether to take 
the stand,202 whether to pursue an appeal203 as well as the right to accept 
                                                          
 196.   Burke, 257 F.3d at 1323.  The court went on to say “[w]hen the defendant is given the last 
word about how his case will be tried, the defendant becomes his own trial lawyer.”  Id. 
 197.   Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 161 (2000) 
(citations omitted).  See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 307 (1988) (noting the “strong 
presumption against waiver” of right to counsel). 
 198.   “Our experience has taught us that ‘a pro se defense is usually a bad defense, particularly 
when compared to a defense provided by an experienced criminal defense attorney.’”  Martinez, 528 
U.S. at 161 (quoting John F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot: An 
Assessment of the Guarantee of Self-Representation Twenty Years After Faretta, 6 SETON HALL 
CONST. L.J. 483, 485 (1996)). 
 199.   Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). 
 200.   Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 249 (2008) (citing ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STANDARDS, Defense Function § 4-5.2, Commentary, at 202 (3d ed. 1993), which states that 
“[m]any of the rights of an accused, including constitutional rights, are such that only trained experts 
can comprehend their full significance, and an explanation to any but the most sophisticated client 
would be futile.”). 
 201.   Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942). 
 202.   Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51–53 (1987). 
 203.   Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438–39 (1963), abrograted by Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 
722 (1991).  
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or reject a plea204 and the right to represent oneself.205  Although control 
over these last two areas would significantly expand overall control for 
the defendant, evidence from case law and the trenches paint a 
complicated picture.206 
In addition to questioning a defendant’s ability to understand and 
make good decisions, the Court has used an efficiency line of reasoning 
to supplant client choice with attorney decision-making.  The Court has 
held, somewhat quixotically, that a defendant’s legitimate autonomy 
interest can be balanced against “the overriding state interest in the fair 
and efficient administration of justice.”207  Courts have also held that 
with respect to many strategic decisions, attorneys may make decisions, 
even without so much as consulting with their clients.  The rationale has 
often been administrative facility.  In Gonzalez, for example, the Court 
said, “[g]iving the attorney control of trial management matters is a 
practical necessity.  ‘The adversary process could not function 
effectively if every tactical decision required client approval.’”208  Even 
the waiver of certain rights have been ceded to the attorney.209  The 
Supreme Court’s participation in the diminishment of defendant control 
has not gone unnoticed, nor uncriticized.210  Clearly, where a client is 
nonresponsive, and counsel attempts to communicate a strategy choice, 
there may be legitimate reasons to allow counsel to move forward with 
her preferred course of action.211  However, where a client has a 
preference over how his defense should be conducted, his choice should 
be respected.  It is disconcerting that the Court cited the ABA with 
                                                          
 204.   Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). 
 205.   Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819–20 (1975).  See also United States v. Teague, 953 
F.2d 1525, 1531 (11th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that “[c]riminal defendants possess essentially two 
categories of constitutional rights: those which are waivable by defense counsel on the defendant’s 
behalf, and those which are considered ‘fundamental’ and personal to [the] defendant, waivable only 
by the defendant.”). 
 206.   See supra notes 138–51, 190–98 and accompanying text. 
 207.   Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 163 (2000).  
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (noting that tactical (non-fundamental) rights can be 
decided by counsel). 
 208.   Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 249 (2008) (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 
400, 418 (1988)). 
 209.   “To hold that every instance of waiver requires the personal consent of the client himself 
or herself would be impractical.”  Id. at 250.  In Gonzalez, the defendant was never consulted 
regarding his desire to have a magistrate judge—not a district judge—to preside over voir dire.  Id. 
at 244.  Indeed, the criminal defendant needed an interpreter, who was not present when the waiver 
was made.  Id. 
 210.   Fear of Adversariness, supra note 17, at 2555–56 (“[T]he Court suspects that, if they were 
truly [sic] captains of their own ships, defendants would insist upon more adversary procedures than 
do their lawyers.”). 
 211.   Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187–92 (2004). 
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approval when it said, “[e]very experienced advocate can recall the 
disconcerting experience of trying to conduct the examination of a 
witness or follow opposing arguments or the judge’s charge while the 
client ‘plucks at the attorney’s sleeve’ offering gratuitous 
suggestions.”212 
The control that courts have ceded to attorneys in criminal trials 
seems at odds with other areas of law, and is hard to justify using the 
typical rights-based approach so often used when discussing criminal 
procedure.  This disjunction has not gone unnoticed by legal scholars.  
Pamela Metzger has argued that “one of the Court’s primary means of 
regulating trial adversariness (sic) has been to reduce defendant control 
over the invocation of Sixth Amendment adversarial procedures . . . .”213  
Vivian Berger has noted the trepidation that the Court has “placed a great 
deal of power in the hands of attorneys [and] . . . bound the [defendant] 
after the fact to virtually all of counsel’s decisions and 
derelictions . . . .”214  Metzger has also pointed out that “[a] criminal 
defense attorney’s obligations as an agent do not ‘mirror the obligations 
of a general agent representing his principal on civil matters.’ . . .  
[C]onstitutional criminal procedure limits the scope of the authority of 
the criminal defense attorney-agent and the criminal defendant-
principal.”215 
VI. SHIFTING POWER: GIVING CHOICE BACK TO THE DEFENDANT 
Multiple variables, including too little court oversight, a paucity of 
resources, the structure of negotiations, and power imbalances, increase 
the number of judgment errors for criminal defense attorneys, resulting 
in too many ill-advised plea bargains.  By giving choice back to the 
defendant, the role of  factors that currently encourage too little 
information exchange, suboptimal decisions, and hasty plea deals would 
be minimized.  Giving indigent defendants more control over decisions 
would address a number of problems that have plagued the criminal 
justice system, including the protection of individual trial and pretrial 
                                                          
 212.   Gonzalez, 553 U.S. at 249–50 (citing ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, Defense 
Function § 4-5.2, Commentary, at 202 (3d ed. 1993)). 
 213.   Fear of Adversariness, supra note 17, at 2555. 
 214.   Vivian O. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths—A 
Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 26 (1986). 
 215.   Fear of Adversariness, supra note 17, at 2567–68 (citations omitted). 
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rights, the proliferation of “McJustice” and “meet-em-and-plead-em” 
practices, and a lack of faith in criminal justice outcomes.216 
A.  Leveraging the Power of the Defendant 
The current system affords the prosecutor an enormous amount of 
power.217  This power comes from the prosecutor’s authority to decide 
which charges to bring against a defendant and what deal—if any—to 
offer the defendant, to say nothing of her choice of trial strategy (should 
the case proceed to trial) and her ability to make sentencing 
recommendations.218  Although the prosecutor is charged with “seeking 
justice” and not simply securing a conviction, once a prosecutor has 
zeroed in on a person of interest, her desire to secure a conviction for the 
people can interfere with the justice seeking function.  The competing 
obligations of the role of the prosecutor are complicated by the fact that 
cognitive biases exert influence on her decision-making, tending to make 
suspects appear to be guilty of the offense.219  Moreover, although a 
prosecutor tends to have more resources than a public defender, the 
prosecutor operates under similar pressures, stemming from heavy 
caseloads.220 
The large number of cases that come through the criminal justice 
system mean that prosecutors rely heavily on plea bargains to function.221  
Like public defenders, “[p]rosecutors have strong self-interests and 
institutional interests in disposing of their cases quickly and 
consensually, so they can pursue other cases or lighten their own 
workloads.”222  This reliance on the plea bargain suggests the potential 
for leverage.223  Even the simple act of delaying a decision about whether 
                                                          
 216.   See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 217.   See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“[S]o long as the prosecutor has 
probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision 
whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests 
entirely in his discretion.”).  See also Prosecutorial Discretion, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. 
PROC. 269, 269–73 (2015); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
257–61 (2011); Wesley MacNeil Oliver & Rishi Batra, Standards of Legitimacy in Criminal 
Negotiations, 20 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 61, 120 (2015). 
 218.   See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364. 
 219.   See supra notes 163–66 and accompanying text; see also Prosecutorial Passion, supra 
note 45, at 184. 
 220.   Incompetent Plea Bargaining, supra note 133, at 164–65.  
 221.   William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703, 1707–08 
(1993) [hereinafter The Ethics of Criminal Defense] (“[T]he state cannot possibly focus its power . . . 
on all defendants or even most of them.”). 
 222.   Incompetent Plea Bargaining, supra note 133, at 164. 
 223.   The Ethics of Criminal Defense, supra note 221, at 1707 (“Libertarian rhetoric tends to 
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to accept a deal would provide defendants some time to make a more 
reasoned choice.  Of course, indigent defendants lack power, so before 
any systemic change could occur, defendants would have to act in 
concert, in a kind of collective bargaining mode.224  This type of 
coordinated effort is unlikely without a movement among members of 
the defense bar.225  However, the theoretical implications of such a 
suggestion reveal a hidden weapon that reformers might attempt to 
wield. 
Even on an individual level, defendants may be able to improve his 
outcome.  In cases in which defendants have insisted on representing 
themselves, empirical evidence suggests that they have been far more 
likely to resist the plea deal.226  Moreover, the available data suggests 
that the defendants who take control of their cases do as well or better 
than their counsel-led counterparts.227  If the criminal defendant were 
represented by a lawyer who was not simply constitutionally adequate (a 
very low bar),228 but instead reasonably well-equipped and appropriately 
motivated, the lawyer might have the ability to gather advantageous 
information, issue counter-offers, and make credible threats to walk 
away from the table.229 
B.  Defendant Choice Yields Good Outcomes 
The Constitution is the strongest mandate for empowering criminal 
defendants to make pretrial and trial decisions, but it is not the only 
reason to give defendants control.  Although the lawyers who populate 
the bench and the bar not only claim, but assume, that defense lawyers 
make better choices than their clients,230 there is evidence that criminal 
                                                          
suggest that the individual defendant takes on the entire state.  But, of course, the state has other 
concerns besides this defendant.  From the state’s point of view, the defendant may be part of an 
enormous class of criminal defendants and suspects with which it can hardly begin to cope.”). 
 224.   This is the difficulty with the argument of Robert Scott and William Stuntz that “[e]ach 
defendant can call on the prosecutor to try the case, forcing her to use time and effort that would 
otherwise be spent processing other cases.”  Plea Bargaining as Contract, supra note 2, at 1924. 
 225.   Transaction costs pose a substantial hurdle.  Indigent defendants are already disadvantaged 
in myriad ways, so the obstacles to effective collective bargaining are too many to list.   
 226.   See Defending the Right of Self-Representation, supra note 19, at 451 (“[P]ro se federal 
felony defendants went to trial (usually jury trial) at approximately double the rate at which 
represented federal felony defendants went to trial.”). 
 227.   Id. at 447–48.  See also infra Part VI.C. 
 228.   See supra Part IV.A. 
 229.   In which case the claim that “[t]he defendant’s entitlement [to subject the charge to a full 
trial] thus motivates prosecutors to bargain—not simply to make offers and walk away” would be 
valid.  Plea Bargaining as Contract, supra note 2, at 1924. 
 230.   Writers have argued that lawyers are simply better decision-makers.  See, e.g., John F. 
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defendants’ decision-making is no worse than that of their attorneys.  In 
2007, Erica Hashimoto conducted an empirical study examining 
outcomes in cases in which defendants had represented themselves.231  
The study contained data from years 1990 through 2000.232  Hashimoto 
concluded that “[t]he outcomes for pro se defendants in the State Court 
Database were at least as good as, and perhaps even better than, the 
outcomes for their represented counterparts.”233  Among other findings, 
the study reported that roughly 50% of pro se defendants were not 
convicted of any charge, and of those who were convicted, slightly more 
than 50% were convicted of felonies.234  In contrast, state court 
defendants who had counsel were convicted of some charge 75% of the 
time (after trial or by guilty plea), and of those who were convicted, 85% 
were convicted of felonies.235  Hashimoto concluded that “26% of the pro 
se defendants ended up with felony convictions, while 63% of their 
represented counterparts were convicted of felonies.”236  While pro se 
defendants in federal cases do not appear to gain a significant advantage 
in terms of outcome, they do not do worse than represented clients.  
Moreover, these defendants are significantly more likely to refuse a plea 
deal, suggesting that they are enjoying the advantages of greater 
procedural protections and not paying a price for doing so.  Even the 
Supreme Court has acknowledged that “recent empirical research 
suggests that [bad outcomes in pro se cases] are not common.”237 
Although the pro se defendant’s success may seem surprising, 
perhaps it should not be.  The lawyer is almost always more 
sophisticated about the legal issues, but the lawyer is rarely more 
knowledgeable about the criminal defendant’s particular situation.  In 
addition to having unique insight into his own preferences, a defendant 
also may have particularized information that could tend to affect his 
chances at trial.  This is information that an attorney might be able to 
                                                          
Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot: An Assessment of the Guarantee 
of Self-Representation Twenty Years After Faretta, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 483, 598 (1996).  See 
also Resurrecting Autonomy, supra note 189, at 1175 (“The predominance of paternalism over 
autonomy can be seen both in the Court’s decisions and in the academic literature.”). 
 231.   Defending the Right of Self-Representation, supra note 19, at 447 (concluding that there is 
no data proving that pro se felony defendants have worse outcomes at the trial level than represented 
defendants).  
 232.   Data was taken from even-numbered years.  Id. at 440. 
 233.   Id. at 447. 
 234.   Id. at 448. 
 235.   Id. 
 236.   Id. 
 237.   Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 178 (2008). 
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unearth under certain circumstances—but with limited time and 
investigative resources, she often does not. 
C.  Benefits to Criminal Defendants of Having Control 
1.  The Importance of Client Preferences 
For several reasons, the majority of criminal defendants will have a 
better experience if they have meaningful control over the disposition of 
their cases, even if the outcome is not a “success” by traditional 
standards.  These reasons include idiosyncratic (and unknowable) 
preferences, a respect for the autonomy of the individual defendant, and 
the psychological benefits of exercising control over one’s future.  It is 
virtually impossible for an attorney representing a client to understand all 
of the considerations that go to the client’s preferences.238  For example, 
a client may prefer to go to trial rather than to accept a plea offer because 
it is important to the client to maintain his innocence.  At trial, a 
defendant may prefer not to call a particular key witness because of a 
legitimate desire to shield or protect that person.  A convicted felon 
might prefer not to appeal his case because he is sick and tired of the 
appeals process and seeks closure.  As the Court has noted in Faretta, 
“[t]he right to defend is personal.  The defendant, and not his lawyer or 
the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction.”239  Not 
only does the client bear all of the consequences of a conviction, he also 
has to consider the implications for others, in light of his pretrial and trial 
decisions.  Ultimately, the best result from the defendant’s perspective 
may not always be the best outcome from the attorney’s viewpoint.240  
The most poignant examples are situations in which the defendant 
prefers not to “fight” a capital conviction.  In capital cases, most 
defendants seek to escape the ultimate sanction, but some do not.  The 
                                                          
 238.   See BINDER & PRICE, supra note 172, at 148–49 (arguing that because a lawyer cannot 
know which choices will lead to the greatest satisfaction, decisions should rest with the client); see 
also GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL 
INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY 103–04 (1978) [hereinafter BELLOW & MOULTON] (citations omitted) 
(“The lawyer . . . has no reliable way of learning the client’s ends on his own.  Because these ends 
are subjective, individual, and arbitrary, the lawyer has no access to them.  Because the 
lawyer’s only direct experience of ends is his experience of his own ends, he cannot speculate on 
what the client’s ends might be without referring to his own ends . . . .”). 
 239.   Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).  “It is the defendant, therefore, who must 
be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage.”  Id. 
 240.   Resurrecting Autonomy, supra note 189, at 1178 (“[T]he paternalistic approach takes too 
narrow a view of what constitutes the best interest of the defendant.  In order to conclude that 
lawyers are more qualified than defendants to make decisions regarding the best possible result for 
the defendant, one must define the term ‘best possible result.’”). 
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decision of whether to proceed with the presentation of mitigating 
evidence or to appeal a conviction is intensely personal, and a competent 
defendant may choose to forgo these tactics.241 
2.  Personal Autonomy & Psychological Benefits of Control 
The idiosyncratic needs of each individual are best supported 
through respect for personal autonomy.242  Concepts of autonomy relate 
to the ability of a person to function as a total, independent human-being, 
governed by self-determination and personal fulfillment.243  Importantly, 
the autonomous criminal defendant is able to engage in self-reflection 
with an eye toward some measure of self-determination.244  This value 
was central to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Faretta.245  Faretta 
defines the ability of a criminal defendant to represent himself as an 
individual right, which is grounded in the “dignity and autonomy” of the 
accused.246 
                                                          
 241.   For an eloquent argument along these lines, see Richard J. Bonnie, The Dignity of the 
Condemned, 74 VA. L. REV. 1363, 1387 (1988) (“In the trial context, no less than on appeal, the 
competent defendant’s interest in controlling his own fate, within the constraints imposed by law, 
should not be completely subordinated to an evanescent societal interest in the integrity of the capital 
sentencing process.  Defense attorneys and trial attorneys should take appropriate steps, regardless of 
the defendant’s wishes, to assure that the definitional predicates for the death sentence are 
established.  Beyond that, however, the competent defendant should be entitled to decide not to avail 
himself of the opportunity either to develop and present a case in mitigation or to try to persuade the 
sentencer that this evidence has sufficient weight to call for leniency.”). 
 242.   David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A 
Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1036 (1990) (“Autonomy is a hard concept to 
define, but as a first cut at its intuitive meaning we may say that autonomy means doing what one 
wants—choosing freely without outside constraints.”). 
 243.   John Christman, Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA 
PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed. 2015) (citation omitted), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/autonomy-moral/ (“Individual autonomy is an idea 
that is generally understood to refer to the capacity to be one’s own person, to live one’s life 
according to reasons and motives that are taken as one’s own and not the product of manipulative or 
distorting external forces.  It is a central value in the Kantian tradition of moral philosophy but it is 
also given fundamental status in John Stuart Mill’s version of utilitarian liberalism.”). 
 244.   See, e.g., James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9 
(1995) (concluding that “deliberative autonomy” in our constitutional culture includes the people’s 
“power to deliberate about and decide how to live their own lives, with respect to certain matters 
unusually important for such personal self-governance, over a complete life.”). 
 245.   See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 160 (2000) 
(“[T]he right to self-representation at trial [is] grounded in part in a respect for 
individual autonomy.”) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975)); see also McKaskle 
v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176–77 (1984) (“The right to appear pro se exists to affirm the dignity 
and autonomy of the accused and to allow the presentation of what may, at least occasionally, be the 
accused’s best possible defense.”). 
 246.   Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834; James Erickson Evans, The “Flesh and Blood” Defense, 53 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1361, 1379 (2012) (quoting United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 1102 (4th 
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Affording a defendant control over process in his own case also has 
significant psychological benefits for the defendant.  The feeling of 
control is an important influence on human behavior.247  When 
individuals perceive that they have control over events, they experience 
less fear.248  “[C]onversely, individuals are likely to view risks over 
which they perceive that they have little influence as more dangerous and 
less acceptable.”249  In particular, psychological research has found 
that criminal defendants whose actual participation in their cases was 
congruent with their level of desired participation were more confident in 
the process and more trusting of their attorneys.250 
D.  Courts Recognize Defendant Control 
The late Justice Scalia, a surprising advocate for criminal defendants, 
once said, “[w]hat the Constitution requires is that a defendant be given 
the right to challenge the State’s case against him using the 
arguments he sees fit.”251  This right of self-determination was captured 
in the Supreme Court opinion in Faretta, in which the Court preserved 
the right of self-representation, saying “although [the defendant] may 
conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must 
be honored out of ‘that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood 
of the law.’”252  In so doing, the Court acknowledged the Framers’ 
intentional wording of the Sixth Amendment, which affords defendants 
the right to “assistance of counsel.”253  According to the Court, the 
choice of language reflected the drafter’s desire to give control of the 
defense to the defendant, and not his lawyer.254  In a number of cases, 
courts have held that where a defendant and his attorney disagree with 
respect to basic decisions about how to proceed, the interest of the 
                                                          
Cir. 1997)) (explaining that Faretta clarifies self-representation is found in pro se defendants’ 
“dignity and autonomy”). 
 247.   See George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 272, 274 (1996). 
 248.   See Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280, 283 (1987). 
 249.   Molly J. Walker Wilson, Cultural Understandings of Risk and the Tyranny of the Experts, 
90 OR. L. REV. 113, 166 (2011). 
 250.   Marcus T. Boccaccini et al., Development and Effects of Client Trust in Criminal Defense 
Attorneys: Preliminary Examination of the Congruence Model of Trust Development, 22 BEHAV. 
SCI. & L. 197, 206–07 (2004) (finding that incarcerated criminal defendants who trusted their 
attorneys were more satisfied with their attorneys and their sentences). 
 251.   Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 184 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 252.   Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 
350–51 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
 253.   Id. at 832. 
 254.   See Resurrecting Autonomy, supra note 189, at 1148–49. 
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defendant in controlling his own case was paramount.255 
Courts have resolved the tension between defendant rights and the 
imposition of an attorney’s choice in a variety of ways.256  Some state 
courts have afforded criminal defendants more control.  For example, the 
North Carolina Supreme Court has held that in a situation in which 
counsel and client are at an “absolute impasse” about a tactical decision, 
the client’s choice controls.257  Other courts have similarly recognized 
the importance of a defendant’s control over process, holding that small 
strategic choices may legitimately reside with counsel, while significant 
decisions should, at a minimum, be shared between client and 
counsel.258   
One such significant decision is whether to concede guilt in an effort 
to gain leniency from a judge or jury.  In State v. Carter, the defendant 
was charged with first-degree and felony murder.259  Over Carter’s 
objections, his defense counsel told the jury that Carter was involved in 
the shooting, thereby conceding the felony murder count of the 
indictment.260  The Kansas Supreme Court cited Faretta in holding that 
counsel’s concession “not only denied Carter the right to conduct his 
defense, but . . . it was the equivalent to entering a plea of guilty.”261  
Although courts are reluctant to reverse or order retrial, in circumstances 
in which a defendant’s legitimate choice was hijacked by his lawyer, 
some courts have crafted a remedy.262 
                                                          
 255.   Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); see also Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 
(2004) (reaffirming that “certain decisions regarding the exercise or waiver of basic trial rights are of 
such moment that they cannot be made for the defendant by a surrogate”); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 
U.S. 1, 7 (1966) (holding that counsel cannot “enter a plea which is inconsistent with his client’s 
expressed desire and thereby waive his client’s constitutional right to plead not guilty and have a 
trial in which he can confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him”). 
 256.   See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 285 F.3d 378, 384–85 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that a 
defendant’s right of self-representation prohibits the trial court from appointing an independent 
counsel to present mitigating evidence over the defendant’s objection). 
 257.   See State v. Ali, 407 S.E.2d 183, 189 (N.C. 1991); see also State v. Roscoe, 910 P.2d 635, 
650 (Ariz. 1996) (noting defendant possessed a “strong privacy interest” in withholding particular 
mitigating evidence from the sentencing court and finding trial court’s order to defendant’s counsel 
to not present certain mitigating evidence was valid); People v. Lavalle, 697 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242–43 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (describing criminal process decisions as “fundamental” and belonging to the 
client). 
 258.   Treece v. State, 547 A.2d 1054, 1058–59, 1062 (Md. 1988) (“[T]he defendant ordinarily 
has the ultimate decision when the issue at hand involves a choice that will inevitably have important 
personal consequences for him or her, and when the choice is one a competent defendant is capable 
of making.”). 
 259.   14 P.3d 1138, 1141 (Kan. 2000). 
 260.   Id. at 1143–44. 
 261.   Id. at 1148. 
 262.   The Supreme Court has stated that a remedy for the ineffective assistance of counsel 
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E.  Strategies for Combatting Bias 
The challenge that defense-attorney bias poses for substantive and 
procedural justice is considerable.  Because the defense attorney is in the 
best position to protect the defendant, and because the defendant relies 
exclusively or almost exclusively upon the lawyer to maximize the 
defendant’s outcome, any factor that distorts the lawyer’s judgment can 
have devastating consequences for the defendant.  In the aggregate, the 
internal (psychological) and exogenous (structural) factors that create 
ethical blindness and motivated decision-making impact tens of 
thousands of stakeholders.263  Moreover, while courts have spent 
considerable time pondering the importance of portions of the Bill of 
Rights for the protection of criminal defendants, the “McJustice” 
criminal adjudication process of which defense attorneys are an integral 
part makes a mockery of these decisions.  Meanwhile, American jails 
and prisons are overcrowded, and prisoners are often released based not 
upon the merits of their cases, but in response to changes that have been 
made by the Federal Sentencing Commission.264  While it is logical to 
reduce prison terms because of sensible restructuring of sentencing 
guidelines, this method does not account for the fact that thousands of 
defendants’ charges were never meaningfully tested or proved in the first 
instance.  Nor do changes to sentencing guidelines increase the chances 
that constitutionally mandated protections will be afforded to defendants 
in the future. 
                                                          
should be “tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional violation . . . .”  United States v. 
Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981).  See also People v. Curry, 687 N.E.2d 877 (Ill. 1997); State v. 
Lentowski, 569 N.W.2d 758 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997); Julian v. Bartley, 495 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 263.  In addition to the defendants themselves, defendants’ families, their communities, and the 
public are negatively impacted by meet-em-and-plead-em practices.  Nationally, 48% of families 
cannot afford the costs associated with a conviction of a family member.  SANETA DEVUONO-
POWELL ET AL., ELLA BAKER CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, WHO PAYS? THE TRUE COST OF 
INCARCERATION ON FAMILIES 7 (2015), http://whopaysreport.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Who-
Pays-FINAL.pdf.  Furthermore, 54% of inmates have minor children coming to a total of 2.7 million 
children whose parents are in prison.  PEW CHARITABLE TRS., COLLATERAL COSTS: 
INCARCERATION’S EFFECT ON ECONOMIC MOBILITY 4 (2010), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2010/collateralcosts1pdf.pdf. 
 264.   The Marshall Project describes the offender release method this way: “[T]he Sentencing 
Commission’s new guidelines essentially instructed the courts to adjust Doe’s offense level 
downward by two levels, which in turn meant that his sentence could be reduced, too.  For instance, 
if Doe trafficked 80 to <100 grams of heroin, he used to be a Level 24 offender, and he was 
sentenced to prison for 51 to 63 months.  When the guidelines changed, he was adjusted downward 
two levels to a Level 22 offender, and he was now eligible for a new sentence of 41 to 51 months.” 
What You Need to Know About the New Federal Prisoner Release, MARSHALL PROJECT, 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/10/06/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-new-federal-
prisoner-release#.FSkCEPVDd (last updated Oct. 29, 2015, 9:27 AM). 
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A review of scholarship on the problem of defense attorney bias 
reveal two categories of solutions. Traditional solutions are generally tied 
to legislative, executive, or administrative action to alleviate the 
problems of plea bargaining, such as judicial oversight or increased 
funding for public defender offices.  Non-traditional solutions attempt to 
address the attitudes or mindsets of the public defenders themselves.  
Very few of the proposed solutions have contemplated behavioral 
science findings; when this research is taken into account, it becomes 
clear that some remedies are more viable than others. 
One popular solution to counteract our current system of McJustice 
is increased judicial oversight.  In the Lafler and Frye decisions, the 
Supreme Court paved the way for increased judicial oversight of criminal 
proceedings leading up to trial.265  In these cases, the Court seems to 
have acknowledged a need for greater regulation of plea-bargaining, 
concluded that procedural fairness was of constitutional significance, and 
trusted case outcomes to gauge prejudice.  These changes are crucial “to 
the broader task of reframing guilty plea adjudication” with methods that 
are both realistic and aligned with established constitutional standards.266  
Scholars suggest these decisions manifest a belief on the part of the 
Court that judicial oversight of plea bargaining will decrease the amount 
of bias exhibited by both the prosecutor and the defender.267  Examined 
through a behavioral science perspective, however, judicial oversight 
appears inadequate to address the failure of process created by the 
ubiquitous plea bargaining system.  Judges, no less than public defenders 
and prosecutors, are susceptible to biases that skew their treatment of 
indigent defendants.268  Overcrowded dockets motivate judges to prefer 
plea bargains, just as heavy caseloads create incentives for prosecutors 
and defense attorneys.269  As such, giving judges more oversight and 
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control over the plea bargain negotiations will likely prove fruitless in 
stemming the tide of plea bargains.  Even more judicial review of initial 
charging decisions270 would likely change little, given that judges have 
difficulty “disbelieving” information that is primed early, just as other 
human beings do.271 
Another proposed solution is to increase funding for public 
defenders’ offices.272  Providing public defenders greater resources 
would lessen the constraints that make actors particularly susceptible to 
bias.  Moreover, providing defense attorneys resources to investigate 
clients’ cases would decrease the motivation to dispose of cases quickly 
and give them tools to gather potentially exculpatory evidence.  
However, increasing funding for any government department is difficult, 
and elected officials have little incentive to funnel tax dollars away from 
infrastructure, law enforcement, and other services to benefit indigent 
defense.273 
On the other hand, “non-traditional” solutions to public defender bias 
highlight the intractability of human cognitive predispositions.  One such 
line of proposals involves increasing public defenders’ motivation to 
work hard for their clients.  An article by Charles Ogletree, Beyond 
Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders,274 was 
followed by a piece by Abbe Smith, Too Much Heart and Not Enough 
Heat.275  Ogletree and Smith argue that the most effective way to 
eliminate plea deal injustice is to instill the public defenders with various 
emotional motivations such as heroism, empathy, respect, and 
professionalism.276 
While empathy and heroism are powerful emotions that can inspire 
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action, they require a foundational belief in the correctness of a certain 
outcome.  Even assuming that a defense attorney is sympathetic to her 
client’s situation and invested in his well-being, she will not be 
convinced that rejecting a plea deal is wise unless she is convinced that 
she can present evidence that will make acquittal likely.  She will not be 
motivated to spend her time looking for exculpating evidence and 
building a case for trial unless she thinks that her client will be served by 
such efforts.  Instead, she may spend that time providing other advice 
and services that she believes (however mistakenly) are most helpful to 
the client.  In other words, priming, anchoring, belief perseverance, and 
other biases will create a set of beliefs that will guide her strategy, 
regardless of how compelling she finds her client’s predicament. 
Solutions that impose limits upon the human beings who decide a 
defendant’s fate are more promising because they do not rely upon 
counteracting biases that have proven virtually intractable.  In his article 
Fixed Justice, for example, Russell Covey argues that the best course of 
action is to limit the ability of a prosecutor to pressure a defendant to 
take a deal by threatening him with a disproportionately severe sentence 
if he goes to trial.277  According to Covey, restricting prosecutors’ ability 
to use scare tactics would increase the likelihood that indigent defendants 
will choose to take their chances at trial, where the substantial burden 
remains on the prosecution.278  As examined through the behavioral 
science lens, Covey’s proposal seems to have promise. A plea ceiling 
would bind all prosecutors, effectively neutralizing their cognitive biases 
concerning the guilt or innocence of the client.  Without the threat of an 
extreme sentence hanging over him, a criminal defendant would gain a 
measure of control that he does not have in the current system, allowing 
for more informed choices about whether or not to accept a plea bargain. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Criminal defense lawyers operate under professional pressures that 
originate and are perpetuated by several features of the criminal justice 
system.  Although there is widespread awareness of the current crisis in 
criminal defense, the criminal justice system is not equally responsive to 
all stakeholders, nor is it all that responsive to changes in the law, 
because the incentives remain fairly stable.279  Serving the needs of many 
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clients with varying situations, the demands of negotiating in high-stake 
situations, and severe time limitations require public defenders to take 
shortcuts and to make educated guesses about how to allocate their time.  
The Bureau of Justice reports that more than 68% of criminal defendants 
are represented by a public defender,280 and of those with public defense, 
more than three-fourths plead guilty.281 
This number is suspiciously high.  Either defendants are getting 
fantastic bargains by accepting pleas—a hypothesis that seems unlikely 
based upon prosecutors’ own admissions282—or distortions are occurring 
during pretrial decision-making.283  In fact, research suggests that 
defendants should be predisposed to disfavor pleas.  Loss aversion, the 
empirically demonstrated idea that human beings are irrationally 
disposed to avoid certain losses, indicate that plea deals should be 
distasteful.284  Defendants should prefer to take their chances at trial.  
Furthermore, in accepting a plea, the defendant gives up rights that have 
both expressive and instrumental functions. 
In ceding the right to trial, the defendant surrenders his “day in 
court.”  The opportunity to force the state to make its case against the 
defendant is a valuable entitlement, as evinced by the fact that the 
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prosecutor is willing to “pay” with a discounted sentence in order to 
avoid it.  Another cost to the defendant when he gives up the trial is his 
required admission of guilt.285  A criminal defendant who goes to trial 
can, regardless of the outcome, maintain his innocence.  Conceding guilt 
in open court—particularly for defendants who are innocent—is an act 
that comes with considerable psychological and social costs.  To 
counteract loss aversion and other factors disadvantaging the plea, 
significant pressures must be brought to encourage the deal.286  Evidence 
suggests that often, these pressures, whether subtle or overt, originate 
with the defendant’s own lawyer.287 
Theoretically, it is possible for a prosecutor and a criminal defendant 
to arrive at an agreement in which both sides are well served.288  
However, the conditions under which most criminal defendants and their 
attorneys operate make this outcome unlikely.  Bargains that are well 
informed and constitutionally sound require adequate resources to 
investigate allegations, sufficient time to file appropriate motions, 
thorough discussion between lawyer and client, and most importantly, 
defendants who feel free to reject the plea offer and proceed to trial.  
Ultimately, “adversarial testing requires defense lawyers to probe 
prosecutors’ cases, dicker over their offers, and advocate for the most 
favorable outcomes available in the plea-bargaining market.”289  This 
rigorous model is far from the one that our plea-bargain-ridden and 
indigent-defendant ripe system promotes.  Instead, over-burdened, under-
resourced defense attorneys doggedly try to keep pace with the steady 
stream of low-income, underserved clients. 
A wealth of social science data establishes that distortions in 
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judgment occur under circumstances like those facing public defenders.  
Given what we know, there is good reason to worry about the attorney-
choice model.  Defense attorneys and courts should advocate for a 
greater role of the defendant in making decisions—particularly when 
plea deals are on the table.  Public defenders should encourage their 
clients to consider their own preferences in the decision-making context.  
Courts should adopt a skeptical view of decisions made exclusively by 
defense lawyers, particularly when the client has objected to the lawyer’s 
choices.  Courts should also be willing to consider overturning plea deals 
when there is evidence that psychological and emotional pressure was a 
factor in getting the defendant to plead guilty.  Returning decision-
making power to the criminal defendant would mean fewer innocent 
people in prison, better psychological outcomes for criminal defendants, 
and a more ethical and accurate process of meting out criminal justice.. 
 
